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Why Was Oppenheimer Fired?

New Republic

An Exclusive Report by Michael Straight

The Two Roy Cohns

Trial by Television—V

Indo-China: *Will the Radford Plan Work?*

Malcolm Cowley: *Russian and American Fiction*

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JUN 10 1954

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T. R. B.

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Washington Wire

There was much nostalgia in the newspaper stories on June 6, written by surviving members of the band of correspondents who landed with American troops in Normandy 10 years earlier. There were also critiques of the invasion—the blunders, the mislanding of paratroops and gliders, the overloading of shorebound craft, the help we got from the incredible errors and misconceptions of the German General Staff.

Still, the event itself was a brave and bold venture, conceived with courage and imagination and stamped forever in the history books with the overriding word, "Success!" France was liberated, the Nazis overwhelmed and Hitler fell. The invasion and the campaigns that followed, no matter how, and military analysts may quibble, were surely the most remarkable example in history of the operation of Allied armies.

General Eisenhower had much to do with this. It is not improper, however, to remember that the political architects of that era—Winston Churchill and the late Franklin D. Roosevelt—bore the supreme burden, and that they worked with tools sharpened by earlier statesmen who understood the importance of American and Western European alliances.

We are now in a different age—and the center of events, for the moment, is Asia at least as much as Western Europe. It is China and Indo-China, the orientation of India and Indonesia, and exactly what the French think stubbornly they can still salvage from colonial territories they should long ago have prepared for self-government.

The Republican leader in the Senate, a Knowland with something of the wild bull in him, chose the evening of the D-day anniversary to rustle alarums and excitements about Indo-China and Geneva.

"Basic decisions" must be made within 30 days, Knowland said, about "defending" Southeast Asia and about the Geneva conference. He didn't specify, but he seemed to suggest that what we should do is walk out of Geneva, if Ho Chi Minh's spokesmen don't do what we wish, and start dropping bombs and funneling in ground troops.

Once again the statement must be made, Knowland is not our President or our Secretary of State. But so long as he talks as if he is, the President is not master in his own house.

The Sweet Singer of the Ozarks, Rep. Dewey Short of Missouri, Republican Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told some amphibious warriors at the Marine base at Quantico to be "ever vigilant" against the potential "disaster" of a merger of our military forces.

Merger might be proposed as an economy measure, Short warned, in the guise of "eliminating duplication." But this approach would be "insidious," because in "protecting the pocketbook the trousers may disappear."

Those who have listened to Short for many years, as he lashed "extravagance" in military and other governmental fields, may be forgiven a sense of bewilderment.

The Missouri Republican is a former student at many universities, including Oxford in England, but one does not remember any other occasion on which he warned that "protecting the pocketbook" might cause the trousers to disappear. He has won re-election in his Ozarks district, repeatedly, by playing the isolationist clown rather than the statesman.

Still, it is one of the miracles of our system that a clown, when he is elevated by the seniority system to a committee chairmanship, frequently shows a sense of responsibility—in a speech far enough away from his home district. Welcome aboard, Mr. Short.

It is not too much, we think, to suggest that appointment of Gordon Clapp's successor to the Tennessee Valley Authority is still a serious test of Mr. Eisenhower's capacity to learn from his job. Clapp is gone, to a place in Mayor Wagner's administration in New York City, but he left a good deal for Ike to remember him by.

The plain fact is, as Clapp pointed out, that the law requires a TVA director must swear he believes in the value and purpose of TVA—and a President who calls the great achievement "creeping Socialism" can't get around the law even by the once-rumored device of appointing a famous former football coach to the job.

The President gave his news conference a quotable statement about the Army-McCarthy mess, said it was his last word, and 20 minutes later turned a withering glance on a reporter asking him another question about the issue and refused to answer. The President, of course, will not escape McCarthy by declining to talk about him.

The Junior Senator from Wisconsin has used the televised Senate Subcommittee hearings for repeated attacks on Mr. Eisenhower's closest advisers. He has seemed, in his questions, almost to invite confirmation of his suspicion that Cabinet members or White House aides, including Sherman Adams, "cooked up" the charges against him.

All of this, of course, is a direct assault on Eisenhower himself. McCarthy had the nerve even to make a bad joke of his claim that the temporary chairman, Senator Mundt of South Dakota, had "more influence" with the White House than McCarthy himself would have. This was preparation for a martyr's role—the solitary Senator vs. all the power of the Executive Department.

This observer does not agree with the often-expressed opinion that the McCarthy hearings are silly, inconsequential, and diversionary from principal American problems.

Nothing is more important than whether, during a time of strain and confusion, a single racketeering Republican legislator can undermine whatever constructive efforts a Republican President is making. It is greatly to be feared that in regard to McCarthy, as well as to Knowland, the President is perfectly willing to "plow the long furrow" but isn't clear how to plow it straight.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Intervention in Indo-China: Radford Knows What He Wants, but Will His Policy Work?

INDO-CHINA—seldom has a people been confronted with so many conflicting appraisals from its leaders as we have concerning this one sector of our struggle for national and ideological survival. We are told that Indo-China is a cork which if pulled would loose Communism upon the whole of Southeast Asia. We are warned of its proximity to the Philippines (700 miles), of its importance both as a market and as a source of essential food to Japan—the ultimate goal of Communist aggression in Asia. But we are also told that its loss need *not* mean the loss of Southeast Asia or of Japan. Having been assured at one moment that the Communists could not win in Indo-China, that we could rely on the French effort, we now find that the French are close to defeat and refuse to fight on alone. We were told that the US ought never again actively intervene in such "small wars" ("massive retaliation"); then, that we would send troops to Indo-China under certain conditions; then, that we would *not* send troops under any conditions, only ships and planes. Finally, we are told that a negotiated settlement involving partition would be an "intolerable" surrender—and then again that it would be acceptable under conditions.

Certainly a Communist victory in Indo-China need not make inevitable the loss, through conquest, infiltration or economic warfare, of Southeast Asia and Japan. But certainly also, such a victory would make it immeasurably more difficult both militarily and ideologically for Western nations to retain any influence over the future of hundreds of millions of Asians. Despite its contradictory pronouncements, the Administration *does* have an objective in this area: to avoid total defeat in Indo-China and to prevent the further spread of Communism. But it does not yet seem to have a policy for attaining this objective. What it does have is at least two major policy-proposals. One is being pushed by the man chosen by the late Senator Taft to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford. The other is offered by the British.

Under the Radford Plan US naval and air forces would intervene in Indo-China on a scale equal to that finally achieved in Korea. Air attacks would be confined to Indo-China unless the Chinese Air Force operated from Chinese bases. Atomic weapons would not be barred. The French would be required to grant full independence to the Indo-Chinese states, submit to an American over-all commander, supply another 100,000 troops (by changing their draft laws) and hold alone on the ground during the six to nine months American missions would need to train effective Viet-Namese forces. The heart of the Radford plan—and the part most emphasized to Congressmen—is that *no American ground forces would be used.* Additional forces would have to come from a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO — probably England, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, the Indo-Chinese States and the US) and be, preferably, Asian.

The British Plan calls for a negotiated settlement which would partition Viet-Nam somewhere near the 16th parallel, while maintaining Laos and Cambodia (the other two Indo-Chinese states) intact, and full independence. Truce supervision would be given over to one of the uncommitted "Colombo Nations" (India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia) and the machinery for maintaining the peace made primarily an Asian responsibility. SEATO would be developed slowly, with Asian members, Australians and New Zealanders playing the prominent roles, and presented to Asians as an organization to underwrite their own efforts to ward off further aggression from *any* source. A vast economic and technical aid program would be undertaken during the time gained by the settlement.

President Eisenhower, who sees Radford twice a week, seems to lean toward the Admiral's plan, but he adds conditions: we will only intervene if our allies (the British) go along and if we get "moral sanction" from the UN. The Administration reportedly will seek Congressional approval for that plan before the end of July—if nothing comes of Geneva.

What Is Dulles For?

Secretary of State Dulles sometimes appears to be a passive supporter of Radford—as when he sat by silently, in seeming approval, as Radford expounded his plan to Congressional leaders in a manner suggesting that it had the backing of the other three Chiefs of Staff, who in fact oppose it as unworkable. But the US delegation at Geneva, led by Under-Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, seems to be gradually moving toward the British position. And there is considerable speculation that Dulles, knowing from talks with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden what the British position at Geneva would be and finding it close to his own, decided to devote him-



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self to playing politics with the intransigents of his own party, leaving Eden to press ahead for a settlement.

No Duplicate of Korea

Our intervention in Korea was a stand against aggression—plainly so, and as such applauded at first by most Asian nations. The war in Indo-China began as a civil war. And despite its exploitation by Communists, to the most important non-Communist nations in Asia it retains its civil war character: natives against colonialists. For eight years, until they faced certain defeat, the French refused to grant Indo-China its independence and refused to internationalize the war for fear of losing colonial control. This, to most Asians, was confirmation. "The devil we know," said one Asian leader, "is Colonialism" — not Communism.

So Indo-China does not duplicate the clean-cut issues of Korea. What we do there is liable to be misunderstood in the rest of Asia, *and our objective is to save from Communism the whole of what is left of Asia, not Indo-China alone.*

The Radford Plan essentially is the tough determination to go ahead and do what is militarily necessary to win the battle of Indo-China: do what we can not to alienate the rest of Asia, but waste no time; take the chance and hope that the other Asians can be won back to us later, after the battle is won. Such action could become necessary—if, for example, the alternative to the Radford policy were a crushing military defeat which would nullify Western prestige throughout Asia and encourage Communist expansion.

The British Plan reflects the conviction that such action is at this moment unnecessary, and would play into Communist hands. The Colombo Conference demonstrated a slight but perceptible shift in Asian opinion away from extreme neutralism toward an awareness of the dangers to Asians of Communist imperialism. The shift was most apparent in the attitude of the Prime Ministers of Burma and Ceylon. Given Prime Minister of India Nehru's desire to lead in Asia and his consequent need to keep ahead of Ceylon and Burma, the British reason, this movement in opinion, although slight, offers the West an opportunity to demonstrate that the "devil of colonialism" is dead, while the devil of Communist imperialism is very much alive. The British plan stresses Indo-China as key to this opportunity—without suffering military defeat, we can create a "new situation" in which future Communist expansion will be clearly identifiable as aggression. If on the other hand we choose to throw in more "white divisions" along with a handful of men (only a handful are available) from Asian nations which have long been considered "stooges" of the West — the Philippines and Thailand — we will kill the opportunity, confirm the Asians in their suspicions and make far more likely further Asian orientation towards Red China.

Admiral Radford

The British consequently want the West to show a very conspicuous willingness to negotiate at Geneva, and so focus Asian attention on the Communists and pressure them to equal the Western attitude. Add reasons why the Communists may not wish to intensify their military effort—China's announced hope for a "quiet" period in which to achieve industrialization; the distance between Indo-China and Russian supply sources placing, unlike Korea, the major burden upon China; the risk of another world war, which at this moment neither China nor Russia seems anxious to provoke—and the possibility of reaching a settlement acceptable to the West is not, the British feel, unreal.

Asian Responsibility

If an Indo-Chinese settlement is achieved, the British Plan calls for placing maximum responsibility for maintaining it upon the Colombo Powers. They should be requested to guarantee the territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia, the first areas liable to attack in a Communist "March to the East." India has indicated its willingness to take on "responsibilities" in Indo-China. She should, the British think, be given the job of "policing" the partition of Viet-Nam and the disposition of forces agreed to, thus continuing her first-hand experience, begun in Korea, of trying to work with Communists. Once this involvement of the major Asian nations in the containment of Communism had

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been achieved, the British Plan calls for a *gradual* development of a SEATO which would present itself to the Colombo Powers as ready to underwrite their efforts to prevent aggression in Asia from any quarter.

And that, say the British, would be the "new situation"—one in which a second round of Communist military expansion could be clearly seen for what it was, and the Western powers could be asked by Asians for their assistance. And the time and good will gained by an Indo-China settlement could be spent, as Denis Healey suggests in his dispatch from London which follows, in a mighty effort to shore up the economic and social defenses of nations like Indonesia which faces a serious *internal* Communist threat.

Backers of the Radford Plan, however, see all this as devious "appeasement"—further negotiation will only encourage further aggression. Since Radford's view commands considerable support in Washington, it is important to realize that his plan involves a great deal more than its exponents admit. Air and naval intervention alone can accomplish nothing decisive in Indo-China—as all the Chiefs of Staff besides Radford insist, as the British military insist, and as Dulles was finally convinced, just before the fall of Dien Bien Phu.

American Troops Follow

Even if American troops were not sent in at once, there would have to be some Americans on the ground immediately—technicians and ground-air spotters—subject to capture, and offering an excuse for the Chinese to intervene with charges of "colonialism." But eventually troops in force would have to be sent in. No French government could order another 100,000 men to Indo-China within the next month or two and survive. And even if one could, more troops than this would be needed to hold while we trained the Viet-Namese. No one seriously believes the Philippines and Thailand could provide enough manpower for the job; the same is true of Japan and South Korea. The Nationalist Chinese would not be welcomed in Viet-Nam.

That leaves American troops. In the meantime American planes will be bombing Chinese supply lines and, if the Chinese Air Force comes in, Chinese bases. Use of atomic weapons is specifically called for in the plan. Chinese ground intervention in such circumstances is likely. We would be deep in another war, one requiring, unlike Korea, at least one million men, one requiring, if our defenses in Europe were not to be decimated, full mobilization, constantly subjecting us to the charge of trying to dominate Asia by military force.

So the Radford Plan is not to be quickly accepted as an easy way to settle the Indo-China problem. We may, of course, find ourselves with no other choice—if, for example, the Communists refuse to negotiate seriously at Geneva. But if we follow Radford because we are impatient or because we are goaded by his political spokesman, Senate Majority Leader William Knowland, and Chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee Styles Bridges, who seek to label all negotiation "appeasement," or by the champions of "preventive war," we will contribute to the Communists an Asia more ready to accept the Communists' most fanciful propaganda and a Western alliance torn apart by internal dissension.

A British Proposal

An Anglo-American Policy for Asia

NOW THAT the dust of Dien Bien Phu has settled, it is clear that, however much America and Britain may differ in the assumptions governing their approach to Asian problems, the political and military facts have brought them so close together that it should be possible for them to frame a common policy.

There has never been any disagreement about the ultimate aim—both want to halt the expansion of the Communist bloc in Asia. Neither country wants its Asian policy to involve it in a fight to a finish with the Communist bloc at this moment; America is almost as vulnerable as Britain to Soviet atomic weapons. Second, neither country wants to be bogged down in an indecisive Asian war which could only sap its strength even more disastrously than Korea, with even less prospect of a satisfactory conclusion.

If so much is agreed, then the first task is for the two countries to list the military forces which they could make available for a containment policy in Southern Asia. This is presumably the purpose of the Five Power staff talks now taking place. They must begin by asking themselves whether the West's capacity for "instant and massive retaliation at times and places of its own choosing" is in fact relevant to the Asian situation. Surely the development of the Indo-China crisis has shown that it is not. In the first place, Communist Asia provides few decisive targets for the employment of atomic weapons; China is less vulnerable to the New Look than any other major power. And in the sort of jungle guerrilla fighting which the Communists employ in Asia even tactical atomic weapons are of doubtful value. In the second place, the employment of atomic weapons against civilian targets in Asia would certainly appall the Asian peoples who have not yet committed themselves in the Cold War; the slow movement of non-Communist opinion toward the West would be catastrophically reversed. In the third plice, China would not fail to call upon her Russian ally for retaliation in kind against the West.

Thus the military containment of Communism in Asia must be sought primarily by conventional armed forces. Here the available strength of the Western powers is at present severely limited. Though perhaps they might scrape together naval and air forces sufficient to guarantee absolute supremacy in these fields this could have only a marginal influence on the course of fighting in Southeast Asia. Indeed the French did possess such supremacy in Indo-China, but it was not decisive, even during the siege of Dien Bien Phu.

British Commitments

Effective defense must depend overwhelmingly on ground forces. Here the picture is somber indeed. All Britain's 10 divisions are already committed outside her own islands. She would be most reluctant to raise new divisions by extending conscription, for most British experts believe that the proportion of national servicemen to regular soldiers is already too high for efficiency. The only area in which British commitments might be reduced at present is the Middle East, where failure to reach agreement with

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

Dulles and Eden

Egypt on the Suez Canal base condemns some 80,000 British troops to sweat away their time guarding junk equipment. The failure of 170,000 French troops to hold Communism in Indo-China suggests that only a reinforcement of 10 divisions would provide a military barrier in Southern Asia. And it is uncertain whether France will be prepared to make available for general defense in Asia the forces she has so far committed in Indo-China. She desperately needs to strengthen her counterpoise to German power in Europe; and the final transfer of sovereignty to the Associated States will liquidate her remaining national stake in Indo-China.

It is therefore difficult to resist the conclusion that to construct a military barrier in Southern Asia would require a great increase in defense expenditure and military man-power by Britain and the USA, unless the deficiency could be made good by the Asian countries themselves.

Creeping Intervention

At present few of the Asian countries are politically ready for such a contribution, and of those few, South Korea, Formosa and the Philippines could not strengthen the decisive Southern front against China, except to the extent that by threatening diversions in the North, they might prevent some Chinese troops from moving South. The problem therefore must now be seen as primarily a political one—to persuade either the Western peoples or the uncommitted Asian peoples or both to accept new sacrifices for the defense of Southern Asia. There is a school of thought in the United States which seems to hold that public opinion must be jolted into accepting new sacrifices by an irreversible military intervention in the Indo-China war. This idea of entangling the Western countries in Asia by a policy of creeping intervention involves gambling that once America has committed a division to Indo-China, she will be compelled to reinforce failure by committing a whole army. That such a gamble would come off in an election year may well be doubted. The further gamble that Britain and America's other European allies would be compelled to add their military weight is also dangerous; it might do irreparable damage to the Western Alliance.

It would be foolish to underestimate the military importance of Indo-China to the defense of Southern Asia, or to pretend that Western prestige will not suffer by its loss. But a prize of infinitely more importance than Indo-China could be thrown away if the West chose the wrong methods for trying to save Indo-China from Communism. India is now one of the world's great powers, although she has not so far chosen to exercise her power by military means. It is worth remembering that for a century the defense of the Middle East depended entirely on the Indian Army. In the long run nothing in Asia is quite so important to the West as winning the co-operation of the 400 million in the Indian subcontinent, particularly now that China is already lost.

Britain may feel this point more strongly since India is a member of the Commonwealth, but America is quite as much concerned. At the moment Indian opinion is moving perceptibly toward a more realistic appreciation of the Chinese danger, but ill-considered Western behavior over Indo-China could rapidly reverse this trend. Nothing would suit the Communist bloc better than to see the Western powers bogged down in a hopeless war in Asia which set the stream of Asian opinion flowing strongly against them. The problem for the West in fact is to find a policy for the defense of non-Communist Asia in which the Asian peoples themselves will play the leading part. This after all was presumably the thought behind President Eisenhower's unfortunate campaign slogan that American policy should be to let "Asians fight Asians." In other words, as Dean Acheson used to say, the West can only supply the missing component in a policy which the Asian peoples themselves create and buttress.

Asian Moral Support

If hard thinking about the implications of Indo-China can lead American opinion back to this crucial insight, then the way is clear for valuable constructive co-operation between Britain and the USA on Asian policy. The problem is to ensure that the next Communist aggression in Asia appears to Asians like Korea, not like Indo-China. Though the Asian countries made little military contribution to UN action in Korea, they fully supported the original finding that what had occurred was aggression under the Charter.

The first necessity, therefore is that if possible the Indo-China war should be ended under conditions acceptable to Asia, so as to draw a juridical boundary round Communist gains beyond which advance is seen as aggression under the Charter. And if this is frustrated by Communist intransigence it must at least be clear that the responsibility for failure does not lie with any of the Western powers. The desire to emerge from Geneva with the support of uncommitted Asian opinion explains all in Mr. Eden's behavior which has upset and embittered so many in America and France.

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It is difficult to see how any formal settlement could be made in Indo-China without involving the United Nations at some stage—the recognition of new governments or states in Indo-China would make this inevitable. But if the United Nations is involved at all, the question of Chinese representation will have to be faced. Many of the formal American objections to the membership of Red China will fall if there is an agreed settlement in Indo-China and Korea. And the readiness of the non-Communist Asian countries to test further Chinese behavior by the standards of international law will depend on the international organization admitting China as subject to that law.

Red China and the UN

There is the feeling in Europe that American opinion on this issue is shifting a little at last. The real question is whether some way can be found of negotiating the two major difficulties which Red China's admission to the United Nations would create. First, is it essential that China should remain a member of the Security Council? In Europe the importance which America attaches to this issue is difficult to understand, since the Security Council already contains the Soviet Union whose veto by itself is sufficient to prevent action.

The second problem arising here is, of course, the position of the Nationalist Chinese in Formosa. This problem is a physical one as well as a diplomatic one. In no circumstances must the million Nationalist Chinese in Formosa be handed over against their will to the Communist regime. There is a strong case for establishing some form of United Nations trusteeship over the island of Formosa, to accept responsibility for these men until the diplomatic problem is nearer a solution.

If the immediate problems arising from Indo-China can be solved in some such way, it would greatly ease the moral question of the West in organizing resistance through the United Nations to any further act of Communist aggression in Asia. In other words, at worst, a new aggression might be met as in Korea by action under the United Nations auspices with at least the moral support of non-Communist Asia. Is it possible to go further than this and establish in the near future some sort of Asian defense organization with Western support?



Prime Minister Nehru

Like America's immigrants, the peoples of South Asia have just escaped from European control and the last thing they want is to be entangled once again in the "wicked power-politics" of the imperialist powers. It is not for a people which passed the Neutrality Act less than 20 years ago to blame them for this attitude. What the Colombo powers want is a Monroe Doctrine for Southern Asia. But perhaps they realize, as many Americans have come to admit, that the success of such a Monroe Doctrine would depend on the readiness of other powers to defend them against external aggression. So they might welcome an East Asia Pact, although they did not join it.

Asian Defense Pact

It is not difficult to imagine a diplomatic device by which such a situation could be formalized. It might be possible to construct a multilateral Asian non-aggression pact to which the Western powers, the Communist powers and the Colombo powers would all subscribe. This would, of course, be less satisfactory on the surface than full Asian participation in a new defense pact against Communist expansion. But in practice the difference would not be so great as might be imagined. At least such a non-aggression pact would strengthen still further the moral position of the West in Asia and throw more heavily than ever on the Communists the onus and odium of disturbing the status quo.

But of course the ultimate aim of the West in Asia must be to obtain the full participation of all the non-Communist Asian states in the democratic international community we are trying to construct. Our success in this will depend to some extent on the behavior of the Communist bloc. It was Soviet behavior more than anything else which made NATO possible in Europe. China may perform the same function in Asia.

Greater progress must be made in liquidating the remnants of colonialism. Once the Indo-China problem is settled, Britain will carry the main burden here, though French policy in North Africa may still have dangerous repercussions on Asian opinion. It is impossible to guess what impact an Indo-China settlement will have on Communist policy in Malaya, but the time has already come when Britain should accept greater military risks in Malaya for the sake of faster progress toward self-government.

The other problem is to help the Asian countries to resist the danger of internal Communist subversion. Above all a combined Western effort to assist the Asian powers in economic development and welfare is required. Such an effort, besides its impact on internal social and economic tensions, would involve Asians in practical constructive co-operation with the West. Providing tact is observed, nothing could do more to strengthen confidence between the white and colored peoples. It is worth considering whether, now that the Soviet Union seems unwilling to co-operate in President Eisenhower's proposal for an international atomic bank, Britain and the United States should not make atomic energy available for peaceful development in non-Communist Asia.

These proposals are not intended as a blueprint for Western policy in Asia, but as an attempt to show the sort of stages by which Britain, America and India might be brought into a fruitful partnership. If, as seems possible, the Chinese Communists are giddy with success, they may push non-Communist Asia much faster in our direction. But on the other hand, a failure by the West to realize that the main prize at stake is India might lead to a repetition of the catastrophe which the democratic world has already suffered in China. In Asia above all, Napoleon's famous dictum is immensely true—the moral is to the material as ten to one.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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Primary Tests of Strength: North and South

NORTH CAROLINA

THREE DAYS before some 310,000 registered Democrats trooped to the polls in North Carolina's May 29 primary and elected ex-Gov. W. Kerr Scott to the United States Senate, a Piedmont newspaper appeared with a subtly phrased political advertisement headed: "VOTE FOR W. KERR SCOTT."

To the average non-Southerner, the text of this "Sneaky Pete" might seem innocuous. Beneath a picture of Dr. Harold L. Trigg, a respected Negro college president, whom Scott had appointed to the previously all-white State Board of Education, the ad said in part:

> Kerr Scott increased Negro appointments to official State Boards by more than 300 percent. He has demonstrated his interest in our race and *has aided our cause of non-segregation.* Vote for W. Kerr Scott for United States Senator, a friend of the Negro. (Italics added.)

Mr. Scott is, as Tar Heels say, not an un-friend of the Negro. Yet he is no passionate advocate of racial equality.

The ad was a gimmick-of-desperation of the Lennon forces. It was signed, legitimately enough, by the Negro president of the "Progressive Civic League." Yet it was placed and paid for by Mayor Marshall Kurfees of Winston-Salem, a Lennon partisan who had persuaded the official of the Negro organization to sign it. This, Kurfees confessed, even before election day. And this, manfully, he recanted before a Sunday School class in the gray and dispiriting dawn of the Scott victory.

The ad was distributed in facsimile by the great gross in Eastern Black Belt counties where such tactics had reversed Sen. Frank P. Graham's first-primary lead in 1950. But this time it didn't work. Scott ads proclaiming his aversion to racial integration were plunked into newspapers at the last moment and in such profusion as to kill the charge, while Scott forces rang publicly for the FBI. As the asceptically non-partisan *Greensboro Daily News* remarked after Scott's victory, "The farmfolks had too long recognized Scott as their spokesman and champion. Certainly they discounted, almost wholly, the Lennon statement that the former Governor's record associated him with the non-segregation cause." And as Gordon Gray's *Winston-Salem Journal* added: "Perhaps this will serve as a lesson to those who are tempted to capitalize on racial antagonisms in North Carolina."

The Scott victory directly reflects his personal popularity with his "branch head boys" as Governor, the man who "got the farmers out of the mud" with an ambitious program of secondary road building. It also represents the resurgence of North Carolina's quiescent farmer-labor element, a smattering of philosophical liberals, rural solidarity (*he lost every city but one*), and the reaffirmation of a reigning taboo in North Carolina politics: no Senator in Tar Heel history appointed to that office (and there have been four of them since 1930) has ever survived a Democratic primary.

OREGON

OREGON, Republican stronghold among the 11 states of the Far West, has been called the "cradle" of the GOP give-away trend, because it produced both Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay and Senator Guy Cordon, principal foe of the Hill Amendment which would have used offshore oil reserves for the country's school children rather than for the big oil companies.

The recent primary elections in Oregon brought no joy to GOP souls. In populous Multnomah County (Portland), Cordon polled only 76 percent of the total Republican votes cast while his opponent, State Sen. Richard L. Neuberger, received 85 percent of Democratic votes. The result was an almost equal vote for the two candidates in this important city area—55,881 for Neuberger to 53,262 for Cordon. In nearly every county Cordon ran behind the Republican ticket while Neuberger consistently topped the Democratic ticket.

On top of all this Neuberger's wife, running for re-election to the State House of Representatives, had the widest lead in primary-election history over a field of more than 50 Democrats and Republicans. She polled 53,000 votes. No other legislative candidate had more than 42,000.

Because of the tremendous stake in political prestige and tradition, there are reports that the Republicans may spend at least $500,000 in Oregon. Six years ago, when Cordon was elected, the Republican State Committee had a fund of $211,000. Its Democratic counterpart could muster only $1,025. Political observers believe Neuberger will be lucky to have an exchequer one-tenth the size of that which is available to Cordon.

Less than the Press Said

THE Supreme Court has added several widely misunderstood footnotes to its historic decision of May 17 outlawing segregation in the public schools. Three lower courts have been instructed to set aside their judgments against Negroes who sought admission to the University of Florida, Louisiana State University and a public amphitheatre in Louisville, and to reconsider the cases in light of the Supreme Court's new ruling. In three other cases, involving denial of admission of Negroes to a San Francisco public-housing project, to municipal golf courses in Houston, and to white schools in the Wichita Falls Junior College District of Texas, the Court refused to review lower court judgments favorable to the Negro plaintiffs.

The press promptly announced that segregation in these various situations had been dealt a death blow by the Court.

But the Court's actions were extremely limited in legal effect. None of the six cases involved precisely the issue decided by the Court in the public-school cases. Conceivably the lower courts could distinguish the public-school decision from the cases remanded to them and reaffirm their former decisions adverse to the Negroes. And as to the three cases in which review was denied, the Court has stated time and again that its denial of review implies no approval by the Court of the lower court decision. Denial of review simply means that for any one of a number of reasons, many of which have no relation to the correctness of the decision below, the Court did not feel that review was justified.

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Editorial

OPPENHEIMER: TWO TO ONE

TWO OF THE three men who sat in judgment upon the past and future of Robert Oppenheimer have ruled against him. Judging by the sense of guilt that pervades the Majority Report, its authors found their task repugnant and their recommendations shocking. Yet judges cannot heed their own preferences in interpreting laws. The judges in this case were not asked to determine whether they would grant Dr. Oppenheimer access to secret data, but whether this action was compatible with standards set by the President.

The Personnel Security Clearance criteria of the Eisenhower Administration orders the presumption of a security risk where there is ground for a reasonable belief that an individual or his spouse has:

> 1. Committed or attempted to commit or aided or abetted another who committed or attempted to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason or sedition.
> 2. Held membership in or joined any organization which had been declared by the Attorney General to be subversive. . . .

The Board was further bound by President Eisenhower's Executive Order which holds that security may be established by:

> Any behavior, activities or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.

Under this all-embracing provision Secretary Dulles could, of course, be declared a security risk due to his close association with Alger Hiss. And it was this provision that was cited to justify the Majority's ruling.

The strong course for President Gray and Mr. Morgan, if they disapproved of this provision would have been to decline to join in its enforcement. Or, once constituting themselves as judges, the Majority could have emphasized its terms of reference and then, freed of restrictions, spoken freely upon them as soon as the findings were announced. The Majority does hint at this course. Starting "We do not recommend reinstatement or clearance," they add one revealing sentence:

> It seemed to us that an alternative recommendation would be possible if we were allowed to exercise mature practical judgment without the rigid circumspection of regulations and criteria established for us.

So, very gingerly, President Gray and Mr. Morgan lay the responsibility for their act on President Eisenhower's doorstep. And yet, instead of commencing with their terms of reference, they mention them only briefly and toward the end of their report. Instead of limiting themselves to Dr. Oppenheimer's status under present regulations they volunteer the view that he should not again be permitted to work for the national defense. They find Dr. Oppenheimer is loyal. It holds, rightly, that a man can be both loyal and a security risk. It argues that the same rules should apply to all public servants regardless of their contribution to the national security. And it concludes that Dr. Oppenheimer is a security risk.

THE Majority's first recommendation is this:

We find that Dr. Oppenheimer's conduct and associations have reflected a serious disregard for the requirements of the security system.

The evidence of association begins with the allegations of the Atomic Energy Commission. Eight of the first 13 concern not Dr. Oppenheimer but his brother or his friends. With sickening solemnity the Majority records: "Dr. Oppenheimer admitted having seen Jean Tatlock under most intimate circumstances in June or July of 1943." He was then Director of the Los Alamos laboratory. She was a rank and file Communist. He loved her, and she is 10 years dead.

The Majority confirms what Dr. Oppenheimer himself asserted: that from 1936 to 1942 he was so close to the Communist Party that a membership card was essentially a detail. The Majority notes that he met with Communist officials in 1946. It also records that in the same year he denied the use of his name to the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions because it included Communists. The Committee was headed then by James Roosevelt and Harold Ickes. But the Majority (which accuses Dr. Oppenheimer of arrogance) declares, "We would prefer to have found an affirmative action at an earlier date."

How early? All of these actions and associations were seven or more years ago. And the Majority gave as its opinion that former members of the Communist Party can by subsequent behavior overcome the presumption that they are security risks. The key words in the Majority finding are *"continuing"* and *"serious."* What evidence is submitted to justify the charge?

In justification the Majority records that Dr. Oppenheimer is prepared to support Dr. Edward Condon in his pending loyalty investigation despite his strong disagreement with Dr. Condon's views. It further records that "in 1946 or 1947" Dr. Oppenheimer helped another scientist, David Bohm, to a position at Princeton and continued a "casual" relationship with him.

More serious is the relationship of Dr. Oppenheimer

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and Haakon Chevalier, who urged him in 1942 to give atomic secrets to a third scientist. Dr. Oppenheimer gave the name of the third scientist to security officials. He did not tell them about Chevalier's subversive activities. Further, he offered advice on the handling of a loyalty clearance to Chevalier, now a UNESCO translator, in 1953. Certainly this relationship suggests a presumption of insecurity under the standards of the Personnel Security Clearance criteria. But the validity of the words "continuing" and "serious" depend on whether Chevalier, like Dr. Oppenheimer, has undergone a transformation in his views since the war.

THE SECOND recommendation of the Majority is this: *We have found a susceptibility to influence which could have serious implications for the security of this country.*

A careful study of the entire Majority opinion fails to disclose on what evidence this grave, but utterly vague, finding is based. Dr. Evans argues, we think soundly, that Dr. Oppenheimer is far less susceptible to subversive influence than when he was fully cleared in 1947. Surely it is common sense to suppose that Dr. Oppenheimer is much more impregnable to the flames of Communist propaganda than those who never burned.

The third finding of the Majority reads:

We find his conduct in the hydrogen bomb program sufficiently disturbing as to raise a doubt as to whether his future participation would be clearly consistent with the best interests of security.

This is the central judgment which, if upheld, closes the door to further public service by America's leading scientist. On what is it based?

First the Majority affirms the Kremlin-like charge that Dr. Oppenheimer opposed the hydrogen bomb on moral grounds. The Majority adds, however, that Dr. Oppenheimer's views involved no disloyalty; that they were shared by "other competent and devoted individuals both in and out of government"; that Dr. Oppenheimer did not oppose the project after it was ordered by President Truman, or urge other scientists not to enlist in it, and that he did not distribute reports to key personnel to turn them against the hydrogen bomb. Thus, all the basic allegations advanced by the AEC are found worthless. And yet the charge itself is upheld.

First, the Majority asserts that Dr. Oppenheimer did not anticipate the President's decision to proceed with the H-Bomb. It holds:

> If Dr. Oppenheimer had enthusiastically supported the thermonuclear program either before or after the determination of national policy, the H-bomb project would have been pursued with considerably more vigor, thus increasing the possibility of earlier success.

Next the Majority equates "deep moral convictions" with feelings of guilt and pronounces that "Emotional involvement in the current crisis *like all other things*



Herblock in the Washington Post

must yield to the security of the nation." (Italics ours.)

History may well determine that these views dwarf the passing associations of Dr. Oppenheimer in their damage to the security of the nation. For if it is upheld by the Commission, scientists are put on notice that when they enter public service they imperil their patriotism. Under the standards volunteered by Mr. Morgan and President Gray, they may be barred from access to information vital to their professional standing if they fail to anticipate a great decision; if they do not show the required enthusiasm; if they are associated with a project that suffers delays.

Under these circumstances science seems certain to suffer. Older men will go on working and many will go on expressing their non-conformist views. But young men from now on must be increasingly reluctant to venture into the no-man's land where free scientists work for the national defense. At the same time Soviet achievements in nuclear weapons are rapidly overtaking our own. Soviet achievements in the carriers of these weapons may have surpassed our own. We are in danger today of losing the air-atomic supremacy that has been our major military asset. This and not the conversations and associations of scientists in prewar years is the present danger that imperils us. We are in no position now to deny the free world the services of leading scientists ready to contribute their brilliant skills or to discourage the development of their successors. If the Eisenhower Order forbids us to utilize the genius of men like Robert Oppenheimer, then the order is the threat to our security that must be revised.

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TRIAL BY TELEVISION—V

The Two Roy Cohns

by Michael Straight

TWO FASCINATING and very different figures moved through the Army-McCarthy hearings. They had the same background, the same appearance, the same name—Roy Marcus Cohn. But apparently they had never met.

There was Roy Cohn, the Boy Rasputin, whom several witnesses for the Army testified they knew well. He had cried "This means war!" when he was denied clearance to a secret radar laboratory. He had threatened to expose the Army in its worst light if it denied his demands for preferential treatment for Private Schine. He had cursed John Adams and Senator McCarthy too, and according to Adams, he had forced the break with McCarthy beyond the point of no return.

There was also Roy Cohn, the Young Crusader—a very different individual. He was more like the hero of a Dickens novel, modest, respectful, self-effacing and kind. Only the suggestion that he might be disloyal to his heroes could move this young man to righteous indignation, as when he exclaimed "Sir! You will never get me to say that Mr. Hoover did anything wrong!" In a somewhat inchoate speech, Senator Symington pleaded that public officials with evidence of wrongdoing should go to their superiors rather than to the McCarthy Subcommittee. Senator McCarthy called on the Young Crusader to answer this "diatribe" and he spoke with pride and sorrow of his patriotic little band:

> MR. COHN . . . the staff a handful, a handful, Sir, of hardworking boys who work night and day up against probably hundreds and thousands of people who work over in the Army and in other places, this handful of people has brought about the removal from defense plants of Communists.
>
> They have brought about the removal from government agencies and from the Army of Communists and spies and, Sir, it is hard to hear them criticized for having done that job.

How unjust of the Army to drag forth the other Cohn from the dark imaginations of evil men, and to dangle it, like a jeering apparition in the face of this servant of the public weal. The Young Crusader looked at the Boy Rasputin in total disbelief. He had never seen him. Sometimes, of course, he used words that he wouldn't use on television but his friends assured him that he cussed much less than most boys of his age. Sometimes, too, he got a tiny bit annoyed, but, Sir, wouldn't you just once or twice if people thwarted you in your exhausting labors of exposing the Communist menace?

The wicked old pixie, Mr. Welch, conceived a clever plot. It was to turn the Young Crusader into the Boy Rasputin in front of 20 million witnesses, by sprinkling something on him that would make him mad. It was on the second day of cross-examination when the kindly Bostonian's turn first came. Suddenly he was a crafty and arrogant enemy, probing, jibing, demanding, interrupting, ridiculing, seeking to tear off the armor and display the lace. Once before at Fort Monmouth, the enormous ego of the Young Crusader had been punctured by the routine denial of a simple pass, leaving a spoiled child in a temper tantrum. Now Mr. Welch was endeavoring to recreate that scene. If he could make the audience howl with laughter at the discomforted witness, then an awful moment might arrive at which, from the noble outlines of the Young Crusader the violent contours of the Boy Rasputin would stand forth.

Plainly what Mr. Welch hoped for, others feared. Among the counselors of Mr. Cohn heads shook in rapid motions of Yes! Yes! and No! No! Lips moved in whispers and groans. Slips of paper with scribbled advice passed rapidly to the red leather chair wobbling

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under Mr. Welch's sudden fury. Senator McCarthy and Senator Dirksen rode in to break up the attack and then the 10 minutes of torture were up. There was a long sigh of relief in the camp of the Crusaders. The two Cohns had passed close by, but they had not met.

On the following morning a mild and contrite Mr. Welch apologized to the Young Crusader who quickly gained the upper hand and held it throughout the day. Nor was there much danger from other quarters. Chairman Mundt made long speeches about Alger Hiss on the witness' behalf; Senator Dirksen served happily as his counsel; Senator McCarthy posed such stimulating questions as "Tell this vast audience what is the *Daily Worker?*"

Senators Potter and Dworshak were harder, but not too hard. On the Democratic side John McClellan and Henry Jackson plodded methodically along in their effort to lay something hard and fast on the steps of the Department of Justice. And while the witness declined, with great skill, to co-operate in this effort he seemed less fearful than he had been two days before. Senator Symington in his turn had a long list of questions on Constitutional issues which the modest witness at first protested his inability to discuss. But if Senator Symington intended to wear down the witness by this discussion he was in error. Nothing could restore Mr. Cohn more quickly to his usual good spirits than the opportunity to educate the nation on its Constitution.

ROY COHN was an excellent witness—eloquent, confident, fast beyond belief, with an answer to every question. Only on the matter of his relations with David Schine did he falter, staring at the table in front of him. And that was an issue that none of the Democrats cared to explore. Gradually the respectful and modest image of Cohn's own choosing filled the television screen, and only the cynical might conclude that the word *Sir* which ended every sentence, hid a thinly veiled contempt for every man present save one.

Now only if the monitored telephone calls could be brought to light might the unwelcome image conjured up by John Adams be dragged into the light once more. Those records were known by many observers to include obscenities and threats uttered by the sweet-mannered Cohn. Yet they could not be released apparently without Senator McCarthy's consent, and that certainly would not be granted. At noon, on June 4 Senator Symington probed into that tender spot. There was at once a cry of pain. Roy Cohn was back at Senator McCarthy's side, whispering and looking sick. The Senator by way of diversion set off a number of firecrackers in Symington's red face. The records remained under lock and key.

Where then did the truth lie?

The Army accused Roy Cohn of outbursts of temper. This much by inference was conceded.

The Army added that these outbursts continued in steady pressure on behalf of Private Schine. This Mr. Cohn denied. And yet in cold type his defense was very weak. He argued that he brought no pressures to bear. Many witnesses proved him wrong. He held next that his only concern was that Private Schine complete his Subcommittee work. On the face of it his argument that Schine needed five months to clean up four months work seemed absurd.

THE ARMY maintained that because it treated Private Schine like any other private it was punished by the Subcommittee in Cohn's rage and desire of revenge. The claim was not proven, nor was it susceptible to proof. But certainly the pattern of Army investigations differed from all others. Roy Cohn denied the claim with vigor. But he volunteered one interesting story.

At Fort Dix, Colonel Earl Ringler had objected to special treatment for Private Schine. In turn Schine told Roy Cohn that he had heard that his regimental commander had called the McCarthy investigation of Fort Monmouth a witch hunt.

> MR. COHN: I told Lieutenant Blount about that and it is very possible, Sir, that I did say I had a long memory and that I would remember the Colonel's name, and I know that I did pass the name along to a member of the staff and ask that a check be made on this particular Colonel because he was talking in a pretty peculiar way about Communist investigations.

At that moment the Boy Rasputin sprang from the shadows, looked the Young Crusader in the face and grinned.

Did they know each other after all? If they had ever met, when had they parted company? The answer, if it was to be found, lay far, far back before this sweltering June day in the Senate Caucus Room.

* * *

Roy Cohn was the only child of doting parents. His mother was also his servant who began picking his napkin off the floor when he was in his high chair and then never stopped. His father had important plans for him and was able to execute them 10 years too soon.

Albert Cohn was a gentle and good man. As a major power in the Kingdom of Ed Flynn, he was Franklin Roosevelt's first judicial appointment. He justified the choice with a distinguished career on the Appellate Court. He laid out a still more distinguished career for his only child.

The child was headstrong, egocentric, aggressive. His father was for him a professional inspiration and a political backer; he was not a companion, a disciplinarian and a guide. Perhaps for that reason the young student had a highly developed ambition and a poorly developed sense of right and wrong.

Roy Cohn was a student at Columbia. He left no outstanding record there. He did not work hard, but that was not the only reason. "Grades in law school,"

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

said one of his classmates, "are determined by each student's approach to his work. The top students spend hours on the *Law Review* but their high grades continue because their approach is right. In contrast Roy had a B minus approach to his work. He just didn't care much about the law."

His classmates in fact saw little of Roy Cohn. Only when the time for the moot courts came did they search him out. Then he was invaluable as the one student who knew every judge in New York by his first name. There was not one who would not preside on the bench at Columbia to oblige Albert's son.

At 20 Roy Cohn graduated. At once he was ushered with the title of Law Clerk-Photostat Operator into the office of the US Attorney for Southern New York John F. X. McGohey. There, apprenticed to two brilliant prosecutors he went to work to convict the American Hydrasol Company. There were no Communists in that case; but there were men who had hidden German assets. And, since the suit involved a violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act, it raised the same kind of problems as subversion. So in that two-year case Roy Cohn learned all the techniques by which prosecutors gain convictions. But lacking experience in life itself, he never learned under what human conditions they should *not* be used. He knew every way to arrive at a given end, and did not know what the end might be.

Roy Cohn's interest in the law was personal aggrandizement rather than anonymous achievement. When prosecuting Communists became the most sensational of pursuits, Cohn persuaded the Assistant District Attorney in charge of the case to grant him a role in the prosecution of the second-string leaders of the Communist Party. He worked hard and well all day, and at night, when his contemporaries went out with girls he joined the company of older, more prominent men. Already they were grooming Roy Cohn. Soon the law firm of Curran and Stim which he joined, became Curran, Mahoney, Cohn and Stim. There, with the Republican state leader and the Democratic minority leader in the state senate was the 23-year-old, picking up large fees for referrals, and sitting in an office that most lawyers would hope to occupy at 65.

At 23 Roy Cohn knew all but the profound and important things. Five years before John Adams called him he knew how to get the theatre tickets to the popular shows, and the corner table in the night clubs. Winchell and Lyons picked up the receiver when he called in with the tip to which there was attached a line of praise. The influential man who could find no room in the city and called Roy Cohn would soon

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find himself in the unknown luxury of a Ritz suite, kept for just such occasions. And always, the next morning, someone had taken care of the bill.

Yet the point arrived in 1952 when there was no obvious step ahead. Roy Cohn was too inexperienced to be a US attorney; too young to be a judge; too ambitious to stay in one position; too much in need of publicity to be content with private practice alone. James McGranery, a party man first, last and always, had become Attorney General. So Roy Cohn moved to Washington. In his brief career in the Department of Justice, where no powerful protectors watched over him, Cohn's lack of humility and of respect for men older caused immediate trouble. The conflict ended when the Republicans moved in. The Department of Justice ceased then to be a ladder for ambitious Democrats. But half a mile away the new Chairman of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee was organizing his task force.

ROY COHN had no ideological interest in Communism when he petitioned Irving Saypol to help prosecute the second-string Communist leaders. He was balanced and moderate in his political views, and less concerned with the Red menace than with his own career. Even after two years of prosecuting Communists, he possessed none of the hatreds that raged in the breast of the Wisconsin Senator. Now as always, according to his contemporaries he asked what was in it for Roy Cohn. The answer he concluded was power and publicity, at once, and in unparalleled amounts. More patient, his Manhattan backers pleaded with him not to join the invader from the outlands whom politicians of both parties in New York suspected and feared. But Roy Cohn believed that his brain and McCarthy's force would be invulnerable. So at 26 he became the counsel to a major Senate committee.

At first sight it seemed a worthy partnership.

Senator McCarthy had suffered from abominable staff work, relying for assistance on hangers-on from Wisconsin, a man fired by the FBI and that shabby crowd of informers who camp around Capitol Hill carrying the *Cross and the Flag* in their pockets and reciting to anyone who pays them increasingly lurid versions of their dull careers in the Communist Party 30 years ago. In the days of President Truman, Senator McCarthy could get by with these men. But as Chairman he had to make good on his own extravagant claims. He had promised that the exodus he would enforce from Washington following a Republican victory would be the greatest spectacle since St. Patrick drove the snakes from Ireland. Unlike St. Patrick he needed help. It was a critical moment for the Senator when Roy Cohn arrived and with him his handful of hardworking boys. From then on they staged the spectacles and wrote the scripts and the Senator claimed the front page as his private domain.

In turn the Senator gave Roy Cohn unheard of power. Generals jumped at his orders. Heads of Departments asked for interviews. The Secretary of the Army publicly apologized for annoying him. He was able to yield three minutes of his time to Senators who wished to be heard. No princes could have staged a more fantastic excursion than the trip made by Cohn and Schine when, in the Spring of 1953 they toured 10 European nations in 17 days, commanding the front pages of newspapers, terrorizing government agencies, leaving gasping officials and ruined careers in their wake.

When Roy Cohn joined Senator McCarthy he brought David Schine along. In the tiny kingdom of his father's hotels, Schine had also grown up as the adored prince with footmen hurrying across plush carpets at his command. He chose to perpetuate the prince's part, and found his way to the one enclave in this republic where, attached to the all powerful Senator McCarthy, he could project the myth of himself. It all worked beautifully until in June the beckoning finger of Schine's draft board broke the magic spell.

Suddenly Schine was one in a crowd, and his protector was unwilling to help. McCarthy wrote to Stevens:

> I have an unbreakable rule that neither I nor anyone in my behalf shall ever attempt to interfere with or influence the Army in its assignments and promotions.

Roy Cohn knew of this rule. He asked General Bedell Smith to obtain a commission for his friend in the Central Intelligence Agency and General Smith pointed out the problems but promised to call the Director of CIA. Then, Smith testified, Cohn demurred:

> GENERAL SMITH: Mr. Cohn said that I need not do this. The CIA, he said, was too juicy a subject for future investigation and it would not be right to ask them to get Mr. Schine commissioned and then investigate the organization later.

A SOUND rule, but one which Roy Cohn broke. He broke it with such vigor and determination that McCarthy fell silent or supported his demands. In turn, to the Senator's surprise, the Army offered to help Cohn. The Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of Staff, the Adjutant General of the Army, the Provost Marshal, the Commanding General of the First Army, two Major Generals, an Admiral, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, three Colonels, six Majors and the Under-Secretary of State went to work at Roy Cohn's request to see if a commission could be arranged for his friend David Schine. When this proved impossible the Secretary of the Army signed an order setting Private Schine apart from the other 430,000 young men who were also inducted that year. And then John Adams was transferred to the Secretary's office to ease relations with the McCarthy Subcommittee.

Great power greatly corrupts; never was Lord Acton's observation more acute. The absence of countervailing power is also corrupting. And it was the spinelessness of Secretary Stevens that turned Cohn's weakness into a

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fatal flaw. Looking back on it all, quite a bit could be said in Roy Cohn's defense, if a frank defense were made. It might even be argued with conviction that, knowing the deep commitment of Roy Cohn to Private Schine, John Adams did look on it as a lever. It was a poor lever among ordinary men, for the most that Adams could threaten was to treat this private as any other private. But perhaps that was lever enough for a young man who by then had convinced himself and his friend that they stood above the law.

So Cohn's palace of cards, that Robert Stevens helped to build crashed down in the Senate Caucus Room. There, 18 months after he picked up McCarthy's banner, Roy Cohn was in the dock where he had placed so many others. In those 18 months he and Senator McCarthy had been through much together. They had scaled the Everests of politics and Cohn at least had suffered. The Senator had considered firing him and in January Senator Dirksen did demand that Cohn be fired. Then Joseph McCarthy refused for by then it was too late. Now they were cast together in the Senate Caucus Room, outlawed by their party chiefs, many times humiliated. In a touching moment they swore again their political marriage vows:

> SENATOR MCCARTHY: . . . First, Mr. Cohn, may I say I have been extremely happy to see the comparison between your answers and the answers of Mr. Stevens and Mr. Adams. I've appreciated the way you've answered all questions and not ducked any of them.
>
> I think your performance on the witness stand may be somewhat of a key to why the opposition feels they must get rid of you at all costs.
>
> And I think your performance here has justified the confidence that I had when we induced you to take this job as Chief Counsel.
>
> MR. COHN: Senator, I deeply appreciate your confidence in me. That means more to me than anything.

Roy Cohn had been given all the power and publicity that he dreamed of. He had defied three Democratic Senators in this hearing, and a great trial lawyer. But, apart from the heat of the hour, where now did he stand in the great career his father had planned for him?

Judge Cohn was a leader in the Democratic Party. His son, a Democrat, was part of a political apparatus whose leader called the movement "the party of treason."

Judge Cohn was a leader among members of his faith. To them, Roy Cohn was a sorcerer's apprentice, the willing accomplice of one whose voice, ambition and manner recreated nightmarish memories of Belsen and Berlin.

Judge Cohn was a jurist, held in high professional respect. His son had proved his ability. And yet, not even the constant recourse to the one-hundred-and-thirty-Communists-in-defense-plants (who by now were worth as much to Joe McCarthy as Texas millionaires) could prevent close observers from seeing that the polish of Roy Cohn's manner was tarnished by the cause he served. Some phrases seemed brutal but appropriate when spoken by one who had known bitter poverty, and spent his youth working the Wisconsin soil. The same phrases were far more repulsive mouthed by the sensual lips of a sophisticated and wealthy city youth. He too spoke easily of "Fifth Amendment Communists" reducing the Bill of Rights to an epithet and demonstrating his contempt for due process of law. He even coined in passing a new epithet—"'Fifth Amendment Spy"—which made citation of the Constitutional privilege evidence of treason. He also held that Senator McCarthy and Roy Cohn were above the law, insisting that they would disregard the law when they disagreed with it, and summon others to disobey it at their command.

Lastly what more could a father ask than that his son's word be trusted? Among all the reporters in the great room, few trusted Roy Cohn. All through the Memorial Day weekend when others danced, Roy Cohn labored to assemble what he swore were the work papers of David Schine. And the reporters who remarked that a lie detector would indicate when Joseph McCarthy told the truth concluded that the papers were as relevant as last year's movie reviews.

JUDGE ALBERT COHN had spent a lifetime teaching citizens to respect due process of law, to obey duly constituted authority and to live in righteousness. Did he now reflect that he had impressed these principles upon thousands of uneducated immigrants and failed in the case of his own adored son? Roy Cohn left the witness chair with a confident smile. But among the debris left by that day's hearings there might be found the shattered fragments of an old man's dream.

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In his Memorandum explaining why Eisenhower will not give Congressional Committees information about Executive conferences Brownell failed to cite the most persuasive precedent in U. S. history.

Andrew Jackson's Defiance

by Wilfred E. Binkley

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S directive to Secretary of the Army Stevens forbidding the giving of any testimony to the McCarthy Committee as to the conferences by which executive decisions were made could be a turning point in a current trend of the Presidency. The Presidency as an office was, of course a creature of the Constitution. As an institution, however, it is a product of history, the experience of the incumbents of the office as they wrestled with the tens of thousands of day-to-day problems and the precedent-producing adjustments that had to be made since the Spring of 1789. Sheer survival induces each President in succession to ask what has been done about this or that detail in the past. Thus the priceless heritage of Presidential experience is utilized and the institution is thereby stabilized. The astonishment of some notable public men at the President's letter to Secretary Stevens reveals a lamentable innocence concerning the history of the Presidency.

For some reason or other Attorney General Brownell's list of precedents provided in his Memorandum which President Eisenhower sent with his letter to Secretary Stevens failed to include the precedent par excellence for the occasion—the reply President Andrew Jackson sent in response to a Senate resolution inquiring as to what took place at a Cabinet meeting in 1833.

Jackson's reply to the Senate Resolution constitutes one of the great landmarks in the history of the Presidency—a veritable turning point if not even a revolution, in the institution. Jackson was the seventh President of the United States. Two of his predecessors in the office, Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams, had been elected by the House of Representatives itself as the Constitution requires when no candidate has obtained a majority of the ballots cast by Presidential electors. John Adams, James Madison and James Monroe had been selected as candidates by groups of Congressmen, that is by Congressional caucuses. In fact for the first quarter of the Nineteenth Century Congress had, in the election of each new President, simply promoted to the Presidency whoever happened to have just been the Secretary of State. It was an era of the mastery of the Executive by the national legislature, a situation soul satisfying to the old ruling class that was about to be engulfed by the rising tide of democracy. There may be those today who long to see the Presidency again reduced to subservience to the power of Congress.

It may be a revelation to some to know that the voters did not then generally elect the Presidential electors as they do today. In many states, sometimes in a majority of them, the state legislatures themselves literally elected the Presidential electors. Thus in this heyday of legislatures the national legislature nominated the Presidential candidates while the state legislature, by and large, chose the electors and thereby the President.

WITH the election of Jackson the Presidential electors of every state in the Union except South Carolina were elected, as today, by popular vote. Thus Jackson was literally the first President of the US to be elected by the votes of the people. So he became the first President to feel under an intense obligation to the people—particularly the lower income groups and to feel unencumbered by any mortgage to Congress. In the prevailing classical vogue he was acclaimed a "tribune of the people" after the ancient Roman tribune who protected plebeian rights by shouting his "Veto" through the door into the patrician Senate. In this fashion Jackson became the first President to veto a measure for no other reason than because he thought it was bad legislation. This was the bill to recharter the Bank of the United States, one of the most arrogant corporations in American history.

The Bank of the United States was a gigantic corporation with branches distributed throughout the Union. Though a private corporation, the federal government owned one-fifth of the stock, appointed one-fifth of the directors, and used the Bank for the deposit and dispensing of federal funds. There is scarcely so powerful an economic institution operating today as the Bank of the United States then was, and its lobby was utterly unrestrained until it encountered the resolute will of Jackson.

When Jackson vetoed the rechartering of the Bank in 1832, there still remained four years to run under the old charter and meanwhile the Bank was enjoying the immense earning from lending the federal funds on

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Wilfred E. Binkley, professor of history and political science at Ohio Northern University, is the author of The President and Congress, *cited as authority in the Brownell Memorandum to Secretary Stevens.*

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deposit in it. Congress had vested in the Secretary of the Treasury alone the discretion as to removal of these deposits. Jackson decided to deal the Bank what turned out to be a mortal blow by removing the federal money from the Bank to selected state banks. When his Secretary of the Treasury, Duane, refused to order the transfer of deposits President Jackson removed him and appointed in his stead Roger B. Taney. On September 18, 1833, Jackson read to his Cabinet a 7,000 word paper containing the reasons for his decision to remove the federal monies from the Bank of the United States. At this point there arose an issue that should have provided probably the best precedent of any for President Eisenhower's decision not to permit any information to be given as to how the Executive arrived at the decision to charge McCarthy and his staff with pressure on the Army.

SEN. HENRY CLAY, who, as the Whig Presidential candidate in 1832 had lost to Jackson, was the outstanding champion of the Bank. He had blundered in pushing through Congress the legislation rechartering the Bank four years before the expiration of its charter in the expectation that its veto by Jackson would spell the President's ruin. Instead the veto contributed mightily to Jackson's overwhelming re-election. But now at long last, thought Clay, Jackson had committed political suicide by removing Secretary Duane when he refused to heed the President's dictation as to how he exercised a power (removal of deposits) that Congress had vested solely in the Secretary. Confident of his strategy, Clay introduced a resolution, promptly passed by the Senate, inquiring of the President as to whether a certain paper reported to have been read at a Cabinet meeting and later published was genuine and if so to lay a copy before the Senate. Today most Senators, but not quite all of them, would consider such a resolution preposterous. It turned out to be one of Clay's major miscalculations.

Jackson may have been an unlettered barbarian as his Whig critics pronounced him, but no shrewder politician ever occupied the Presidential office and not once did Clay win a tilt with him.

President Jackson's response to the demand of the Senate Resolution was prompt, sharp and unequivocal. In a scorching message Jackson informed the Senate:

> The Executive is a co-ordinate and independent branch of the Government equally with the Senate, and I have yet to learn under what constitutional authority that branch of the legislature has the right to require of me an account of any communication, either verbal or in writing, made to the Departments acting as a Cabinet Council. As well might I be required to detail to the Senate the free and private conversations I have held with those officers on subjects relating to their duties and my own.

The outcome of this controversy contains a portent to any Senator who at this late date would seek to turn the clock of history back a century and a quarter. Clay pursued his fatuous controversy with Jackson to its inevitable outcome. His next move was the famous Senate resolution of censure:

> Resolved that the President, in the late Executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority not conferred by the Constitution and laws and in derogation of both.

The President replied with what has come to be known as Jackson's Protest:

> The President of the United States has been by a majority of his constitutional triers accused of an impeachable offense, but in no part of these proceedings have the directions of the Constitution been observed.

But the public as usual in controversies between Senate and President throughout history sided with the President. One by one Whig Senators were replaced by the election of Jackson Senators until in 1837 the Senate passed the resolution instructing the Clerk of the Senate to bring in the Journal, draw a thick black line around the resolution censuring the President and write across it, "Expunged by order of the Senate, January 16, 1837."

In vain had Clay argued against this expunging resolution in one of the greatest speeches of his career. "Must we blot, deface, and mutilate the records of the country to punish the presumptiousness of expressing any opinion contrary to his [Jackson's]?" The frustrated Senator declared:

> The Senate is no longer a place for a decent man. . . . I shall escape from it with the same pleasure that one would fly from a charnel house.

Let Clay's sad experience be a lesson to those who have not yet learned, in our day, what the Presidency has become—both as an office and as an institution cherished by the American people.

"The laws, our customs and hard necessity, combine to make the President the chief of the state, the chief executive, the chief of his party, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the chief instrument of our foreign affairs, the source of appointments and removals, the ultimate source of clemency and discipline, the chief banker and insurance agent, the chief social worker, the keeper of the public conscience, the guide and interpreter of public opinion, the prophet of warning and encouragement—and many other things besides Nor is he these things just for Americans. Because of America's world position, he is all of these things for a vast constituency throughout the world who understand America and its purposes chiefly in terms of what the American President does, how he does it, and what happens to him here in America when he does it."

—Adlai E. Stevenson,
From an address at Meridian, Mississippi, May 26, 1954

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Who Rules Egypt?

THE MOB AND THE ARMY

by Ray Alan

SINCE its victory over General Naguib last March the Egyptian Revolution Council has continued to pick off the leading tacticians and planners in the ranks of its opponents. It has carefully consolidated its position. The press and administration have been purged of unsympathetic elements; "old-gang" party leaders have lost their political rights. Army officers unduly friendly to General Naguib and the old parties have been arrested — fashionably enough — as "Communists." Civilian cabinet-ministers having resigned, an all-military government now rules under the premiership of Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.

But Colonel Nasser and his friends are by no means absolute masters of Egypt. Their struggle with General Naguib restored the roar of the mob to streets that had for months been unnaturally somnolent. In the old days, when a whole spectrum of puppeteers ranging from Farouk to a Communist millionaire pulled the strings controlling Cairo's political life, the mob marched always to other people's commands. Last March it showed signs of going into business on its own account.

Cairo crowds are notoriously fickle in their political allegiances but their vote of no-confidence in General Naguib was an extraordinary phenomenon. Outwardly, at least, the General's position and prestige were still quite impressive. His personality had given the young military régime a *cachet* of solidity—even respectability —at a time when revolutionary fervor had reached a dangerously negative pitch. Under his aegis the cotton market had been unrigged and a creditable amount of corruption eliminated from the administration.

But Naguib was neither qualified nor inclined to tackle the root causes of Egypt's backwardness. The complexity of the unfamiliar art of government, and the subtlety of the economic factors involved in even the most superficial reform, dismayed and discouraged him; he was neither an Ataturk nor a Nehru.

Inevitably, perhaps, he was corrupted by power. The misery of the *fellahin* soon seemed to mean less to him than the prominence given his speeches by Cairo radio and the size of his photo in *el-Ahram*. He began to see himself less as the figurehead of an ephemeral military revolt, precariously dependent on the majority vote of his fellow-conspirators, than as a national figure, above the day-to-day strife of politics.

This was more than sufficient to erode the military Revolution Council's confidence in Naguib; and the process of erosion was speeded up and its area extended by the indiscretions of his admirers in the West. Impressionable visiting firemen from John Foster Dulles down to wide-eyed small-town columnists were soon toadying to Naguib in terms that took a fantastic amount for granted and suggested to the Arabs that the free world must indeed be desperate for friends. But it was the last straw of British official comment that helped break the Egyptian camel's back. When the British Foreign Office's propaganda-battery in the Near East—it includes an Arabic-language radio station, an "Arab" news-agency and a stable of publications—began patting Naguib on the back and appeared in the first three months of this year to be supporting him against his former colleagues, Egyptian suspicions were seriously aroused.

IT WAS Naguib himself who forced a showdown. He split the army overnight by pressing for outright liquidation of the Revolution Council and the establishment of a more nearly constitutional régime with himself at its head. Resisting this demand, Colonel Nasser argued that the very fact that even Naguib felt obliged to purchase popularity by attacking American policy in his public statements was a sufficient reminder of the limitations under which a constitutional régime would suffer: it would degenerate within a matter of weeks into a competition in the abuse of the Western powers. Only continued army rule, Nasser urged, could conduct a consistent foreign policy and push through a program of social reform.

Several weeks of sheer slapstick followed. The world was regaled with glimpses of a President-*cum*-Premier editing his favorite newspapers, of a Minister of "Na-

Ray Allen is a British journalist who has specialized in reporting political affairs of the Middle East.

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tional Guidance" locking himself in a prison-cell, and of internment-camp gates being opened and closed, prisoners being released and rearrested and orders being issued and countermanded with a chaotic frequency that suggested Egypt's military strong men had all along been undercover anarchists. Students threw away their books and went back to their pre-republican pastimes of chanting slogans and letting off bombs. And steadily, day after day, at first in the background but soon in the forefront of the Cairo scene, the half-forgotten clamor of the mob grew louder.

ITS FIRST comeback was in support of General Naguib. It was herded around the streets, as of old, by such expert mob-manipulators as the theoretically banned *Ikhwan* (Moslem Brotherhood) and *Wafd* (ex-Premier Nahas' party) and other "old-gang" elements aware that Naguib was now offering them a shortcut back to power. Many who demonstrated in his favor were undoubtedly sincere: they found it impossible to believe the Revolution Council's allegations that Naguib intended to liquidate the new régime. A similar disbelief, aided by "old-gang" intrigue, swept the Cairo officers' club.

At this point Nasser and his colleagues seem to have realized that the best person to convince doubters was Naguib himself. They yielded to the storm, gave Naguib his head and withdrew watchfully into the middle distance. The General's new allies soon discredited him. Within a few days the "old gang" were confidently carving out spheres of influence and putting back the clock before the nation's very eyes. The army rallied once more round the Revolution Council—and then the mob again took a hand.

During the last two months what might be described as the conservative right wing of the military movement has all but withered away. Naguib's cautious civilian collaborators and advisers have followed him into eclipse. Power within the Revolution Council is now shared between the radical Left, emboldened by the emergence of the labor unions as a potential political force, and the less adventurous center with Colonel Nasser holding the balance.

The Nasser government's most important measure so far has been the resumption of land reform. According to the Premier, some 620,000 acres have by now been confiscated from the royal family and other big landowners for distribution among the *fellahin*: ultimately about a quarter of Egypt's landless peasants will be given plots of their own. In the field of foreign policy, Colonel Nasser has given the Egyptians, in his public pronouncements, the sort of routine denunciation of the Western powers they like to hear, though couched in slightly more moderate terms than are usually employed and distinguished by an unusually realistic approach to the Palestine problem. Here (slightly condensed) are samples of his public views over the last few months:

—Any Arab state adhering to the American-sponsored Turkish-Pakistani pact will be regarded by Egypt as having violated the Arab-League Covenant.

—American talk of "self-determination" and "helping under-developed countries" is no more than opium administered so as to perpetuate the domination of enslaved peoples by the so-called "Free World."

—America needs the support of British imperialism in her feud with Russia. She will not risk upsetting Britain merely to please us! and British imperialism is our worst malady and calamity.

—To blame the Jews for the Palestine catastrophe is to put the cart before the horse. The real culprits are the old-gang Arab leaders, and behind them, Britain.

At the same time Nasser has succeeded in convincing US Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey and an important section of British official opinion in Cairo that Egyptian goodwill toward the West (defined by one of his aides as "sympathetic neutrality") can only now be secured by complete British evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone.

But Colonel Nasser's very talent for winning so many friends and influencing such a wide variety of people raises the fundamental question: Which is the real Nasser? The one Mr. Caffrey finds so convincing (only a few months ago Mr. Caffrey was certain Naguib had come to power to stay) or the one who got his mandate from the Cairo mob? The former Nasser might well give London a pledge on the reactivation of Suez; but would the latter be able to honor it? Would he even be there to honor it, 12 or 18 months later?



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Rome Dispatch PLUMBING AND PARTY LINES

All roads led to Rome—perhaps a million visitors from all parts of the free world came to Italy by sea, land, air and even by foot to attend the unusual—and also unusually solemn and splendid—ceremonies of the canonization in the Basilica of Saint Peter of six new saints of the Roman Catholic Church. The man elevated to the saint-hood was a relatively recent occupant of the See of Saint Peter, Pope Pius X, known with affectionate veneration as *Papa Sarto*.

More than 45 Cardinals, nearly 400 Bishops, the heads of practically all the religious orders, and leading Catholic laymen—a larger assembly than any in modern times (except during a Holy Year.)—gathered for the occasion. For it was the first time in two and one half centuries (since 1712) that a Pope has been canonized; and the first time in this Twentieth Century that the head of the Church, whose personality and conduct have been universally identified with mankind's permanent longing for peace, was made a symbol of that desire. The influx of visitors was particularly great for two additional reasons. The present Pope has long passed his three score and 10; though he has recovered from his recent illness, his strength is known to be waning; and there was widespread belief that this might be the last ceremony of its kind over which he would be able to preside. And in no small measure, the gathering in Rome to see and hear *Papa Pacelli* was also a symbol of solidarity and support for the anguished pleas which he has been making ever more frequently in recent months on behalf of a universal spiritual mobilization for peace in our time.



Rome was jam-packed. There wasn't a hotel room—or any other kind of room—to be had for money or love or any other currency. Proportionately the visitors from the US—or at least from the official hierarchy of the Church—were unusually numerous. The French were also well represented. And we had occasion to discover—from our own direct observation and that of French newspapermen—the presence among the French pilgrims of not a few whom we could recognize as persons who had been previously seen in Paris in places and at times suggesting that they were militant supporters of Communism, if not actually card-carrying members of the French Communist Party.

Apparently the current Communist line of "appeasement" of Catholicism and of a new united front, this time not with the liberal Left but with the Catholic Center against the threat of atomic war, which was started here in Italy some time ago, has now been extended to apply to France as well. The extension may seem natural, self evident, an inevitable broadening out of tactics from one Catholic country to another. At least it may seem so in the US where there is a tendency to lump together the French and Italian Communists, perhaps because Paris and Rome share the dubious distinction of being the two major Communist capitals of the Western world.

In reality, however, the two movements are separated by marked differences, tactically and even more, humanly. So are, in fact, the anti-Communist movements of the two countries, even though they have in common their internal political divisions which have thus far prevented ratification of the EDC by their parliaments.

Here in Italy, for example, a large number of the Communists attend church regularly, quite independently of the current line of the party for or against such attendance. They read the anti-clerical invective of the party newspapers but, taking no chance of divine wrath, they stop off for mass on their way to the Sunday rally (or, more often, the football game). In France, on the other hand, militant anti-Communists stay away in droves from the churches.

As a matter of fact, the distinctions of politics in both countries tend to blur in regard to attitudes toward the Marxist fundamentals of food, shelter, clothing. The Italian Communist man is probably the best dressed, the French Communist the best fed Communist in the world.

Of course, Communism in both countries feeds on poverty; and there is far more of it in Italy than in France. Housing is a problem in both countries too, but in this respect, the French are doing almost nothing whereas building booms continue in most Italian cities. In Rome alone, four luxury neighborhoods are being extended in the best Florida boom manner; and six middle-class neighborhoods are steadily pushing the city's limits out into the countryside.

In both countries the US financial help has ended for the most part in the pockets of relatively small minorities. In France, the money tends to disappear into the sock; here it goes into circulation. The new Roman apartments, for example, are for sale, rather than rent. Scores of thousands of them have been built during the last few years. The cost of a 4-room apartment in the Parioli, Salaria, Vescovia or Nomentana neighborhoods is about $20,000; in the San Giovanni, Monteverde, Flaminia, Montemario, Medaglia d'Oro or Africano areas, it is about $12,000. And, somehow, they are being sold.

What the typical Italian Communist really wants is such an apartment; and they all have pretty good US equipment. However anti-American he may be on the so-called ideological level, he is quite definitely pro-American about the material facts of life.

The Italian Communist Party's sudden respect for the Pope stems from little more than a recognition that the rank and file of the party, neither bitter nor resentful about the Americans, may perhaps be brought to anti-Americanism by distorting the Pontiff's anxiety about ABC war into a fear of Washington's military intentions. But whatever the Holy Father may think or feel, there is little trace among the Italians either of anxiety or of fear. Large numbers of the poor folk would still love to emigrate to the US, as their ancestors did a generation or two ago. Failing that chance, they welcome as second best the immigration to them of some of the material elements of the American way of life.

Rome FRANK GORRELL

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Russian & American Fiction: Two Ideals

by Malcolm Cowley

THERE is a general literary movement that seems to be dominant everywhere in Western literature: it is a movement from sociology to psychology, from political to personal problems, in a word, from the public to the private. East of the Elbe—and with variations among the minority of Communist writers in France and Italy—there is a movement in the opposite direction, from novels about individual lives to novels about masses of men, written with a public purpose.

That purpose, in France and Italy, is to prove that the workers are mistreated and hence to prepare them for a Communist seizure of power; the novels are revolutionary. In Russia the novels are patriotic, conformist, and their purpose is to advance various programs of the Soviet state. Every Communist who appears in the novels is supposed to be heroic; the non-Communists can become heroic by accepting Communist leadership; the anti-Communists are always villains. All the characters represent political tendencies or attitudes toward the state and so little is said about their private lives that they almost cease to be persons.

There are substantial rewards and punishments for Russian writers. Those who follow instructions earn a great deal of money—often more than they can spend—and occupy a more privileged social position than their colleagues in the West. Those who disobey the watchful censors aren't published at all, no matter how popular their past work may have been. Some of the censors are politicians, but others—to the discredit of the profession—are writers jealous of their colleagues and anxious to preserve a reputation for conformity.

Fantastic as the situation seems to us, it bears a resemblance to some American practices. Radio and television writers in this country are under almost as close surveillance by patriotic pressure groups. Some of our authors help the pressure groups by denouncing their colleagues. Some of our mass-circulation magazines—though by no means all of them—present subjects for treatment by fiction writers they can trust. "Why don't you do a two-fisted serial about oil prospecting in the Gulf of Mexico?" the editor says persuasively. "It's very much in the news." During World War II the imposed subject was often the result of a government directive: for example, the Air Force asked for help from the mass-circulation magazines when it had difficulty persuading men to be tail gunners on bombing planes, and the magazines obliged by ordering stories with tail gunners as heroes. Even in peacetime some of our weeklies out-do the Russians by presenting a novelist with both a subject and a ready-made plot, asking him only to provide descriptions and dialogue.

Here the parallel ends. If the American novelist refuses the subject or the plot, if he prefers to deal with more personal themes, he has other avenues of publication. Many writers earn comfortable incomes without once appearing in the mass-circulation magazines and they are admired for preserving a sort of artistic chastity. For a real parallel with Russia we should have to imagine that the *Saturday Evening Post* and *Collier's,* with a very few others, were the only magazines to print fiction, that they were interlocked with the only publishing houses, that they were staffed by government and party functionaries, and that novelists who wouldn't follow their directives not only couldn't be published but were thought to be politically suspect.

We might also have to imagine that a novel approved and published in 1945 would have to be withdrawn from circulation in 1948, although it was still extremely popular, because the directives had changed. Exactly that happened in the case of Fadayev's *The Young Guard,* whose author had to make a public confession of error and then had to revise his picture of the war before the novel could be reissued by the State Publishing House.

It would be a mistake, however, to judge Soviet literature in theory by its practice of the last few years. The theory, known as "socialist realism," has always taken for granted that literature exerts a direct effect on social life and therefore has always been willing to admit that a wise society, a workers' society, would control its novelists for their own good.

On the other hand, the theory did not contemplate that the control would be so rigid, so comprehensive, and so anti-aesthetic as it has been in Russia since 1948. There were special reasons for that period of repression and the cold war was only one of them. There was also the Russian habit, which is an American habit, too, of carrying everything to extremes, there was Stalin's attitude toward art, that of a tired businessman, and there was the single-minded Communist efficiency of Andrei A. Zhdanov, who had taken charge of cultural affairs. In 1953, after both men were dead, signs appeared that artists in all fields, including fiction, would be granted a somewhat greater degree of freedom. Even the bureaucrats themselves were beginning to admit that "A creative problem cannot be solved by bureaucratic means," as Aram Khatchaturian, one of the composers scolded by Zhdanov, was finally allowed to say in the magazine *Soviet Music.*

As a theory, socialist realism should be judged by its achievements in years like those from 1932 to 1936 and from 1943 to 1947, when novels were being written and published with somewhat less interference from the Soviet bureaucrats. It might also be judged by novels of the school that were produced in France, England, and America during the 1930's and are now being produced by Communist writers in France and Italy. On this basis, that of its best periods and productions, socialist realism proves to be a theory of fiction which, like naturalism, has produced many valuable and impressive works. As a matter of fact it developed out of naturalism, at least on the technical side, and has retained many characteristics of the

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earlier school. Some of these are the close study of social environments, the interest in the behavior of crowds, the approach to characters from the outside —as if they were specimens for dissection—and most of all the emphasis on subject matter at the expense of form. In Russia "formalism" and "subjectivism" are serious charges against a writer, almost the equivalent of political crimes.

The Russian doctrine resembles naturalism in holding that the novelist can deliberately choose a subject for treatment, almost without respect to his past experience, but it goes a step farther by holding that the subject can also be chosen for the novelist by the workers' party or by the state. In 1948 Russian writers were collectively scolded because they hadn't produced a sufficient number of articles about the new irrigation projects. In 1953 some of these projects were deferred and the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted a new program calling for a greatly increased production of foodstuffs and consumer goods. In December of that same year the writers were scolded again, this time because the new program, after three months, still hadn't been reflected in more and better novels about the collective farms.

Although writers were being given a little more freedom, consumers' goods and foodstuffs were the pressing need and hence an imposed subject for novels. Said the *Literary Gazette,* in a leading article translated for the New York *Times*:

> No substantial improvement in the activities of the secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers is evident, even since the September plenary session of the Central Committee. . . . A great and difficult task lies before our writers: to produce books that help the people in their great creative activities. To depict accurately and profoundly the life of the people in all its aspects and in every sphere of activity, to express the all-pervasive grandeur of the Soviet man and to express the fundamental and typical processes of our epoch—such is the task of Soviet literature. But contemporary Soviet life will not be truly portrayed unless it is shown that the struggle for the prosperity of collective and state farms has become a matter of supreme importance for the people in general.

The *Literary Gazette* was explaining that writers' aims, even in a period of comparative freedom, must still be those of the state and that a socially imposed subject must be executed without delay.

Since the days of Zola, naturalistic fiction has displayed some faults consistently. The principle faults have been a disrespect for language (almost all the naturalists are careless writers), an oversimplification of human nature (making it impossible for naturalists to write in the tragic spirit), and a false conception of the writer's task; he is pictured, not as an artist, but as a scientific observer whose workroom becomes a sort of laboratory. Socialist realism, as practised in Russia, retains those faults with one exception to be noted. Russian novelists are expected to "depict accurately and profoundly the life of the people in all its aspects," but their picture must agree with that of the Central Committee, which is the final judge of literary truth. Old-fashioned naturalists look for and sometimes discover truths of their own.

With this exception, however, socialist realism has most of the virtues of naturalism. It presents us with big, dramatic subjects, it treats them in a bold fashion, and it gives the reader a feeling that the novelist isn't running away from life, but is embracing it in all its ugliness and infinite fertility. The doctrine also has one virtue in which naturalism is conspicuously lacking: it offers a system of moral values and allows its characters to choose between good and evil. Sometimes they choose to do good at the cost of their lives, and then the socialist realist is able to write in something that approaches the tragic spirit. When Malraux was a socialist realist he wrote *Man's Fate,* which is a tragic novel. *The Silent Men,* by Mikhail Sholokhov, is a collective tragedy, that of the Cossack people, and it is the novel of our time that comes closest to being another *War and Peace.* I might add that both Malraux and Sholokhov were writing from experience, or from an imaginative projection of experience, and that neither of them produced his book to order.

It has sometimes been suggested that the ideal might lie somewhere between the present Western and the present Russian practice. One could start with either, I have heard it said, and arrive at better novels by a mixture of qualities selected from West and East. Thus, one could start with the Soviet novel, subtract the bureaucratic control, add a greater psychological depth and more attention to form, and the result would be possible masterpieces. Again, one could start with the American novel, give it broader subjects, more interest in contemporary problems, more social responsibility—without surrendering any of its virtues—and the result would be almost the same. The one weakness of this most attractive program is that novels aren't compounded by a judicious mixture of ingredients. Sift together one cup of psychological depth with two cups of subject matter, knead into form, bake in a medium oven, and the result is nothing.

The Western ideal of novels based on personal experience is essentially right and the present Russian ideal of socially useful novels produced to order is wrong. The Western ideal is right because novels should be true at all levels and because such truth can't be achieved without a long accumulation of feelings and observations. The Russian ideal is wrong because social aims and political programs—especially new ones—are likely to be accepted only on the top level of the mind.

It is always conceivable that some novelists might write very well about the new irrigation projects or about the new program for collective farms, but that would be chiefly by accidents of personality. That is, the novelists might be obsessed, as many persons are, by the image of running water; or they might have risen from the peasantry and might be excited by the vision of new lives for families like their own. But where one novelist would write well about the projects and programs, a dozen would be unable to make the personal connection, and their books would be dutiful, shallow, and nonexistent as literature.

The newer American criticism has provided us with methods for understanding the weakness of novels written to order (including those whose authors agreed with the order and thought they were performing their simple duty). If we examine the language and structure of such books; if we analyze their rhythms, their images, their use of symbols, their choice of significant details, we find that all of these are out of keeping with the novelists' conscious purposes. The optimism is revealed to be

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forced, the convictions to be hollow, the characters to be not of a piece. Subconsciously the novelists have rebelled against the subject imposed on them and have refused to assimilate the information gathered in a pile of notebooks; it is merely information, not experience.

"Man," said Marcel Proust, "is the creature who cannot get outside himself, who knows others only in himself, and when he says the contrary he lies." That is an extreme statement of the limitation under which we operate as writers and human beings, but the limitation can be transcended, as Proust showed in *Remembrance of Things Past*. Man does know others, if only in and through himself, and each life is the mirror of many others. By looking intently at our own experience, each of us can find social institutions and values, the diminished reflection of the world in which we live, so that even the purest type of personal or subjective novel has implications for its age and country. When Proust started to explain what a dinner party meant to himself, he ended by explaining a considerable area of French society.

The weakness of many American novelists today is that the books they write are based on a narrow segment of their experience and that the experience itself has been too narrow. Life on a college faculty or in a narrow circle of sophisticated people doesn't often give the novelist a sense of living in history, nor does it often lead to any broad knowledge of men and manners. I should hesitate to advise a change of life for anyone who has already made a place for himself, though I do think that apprentice novelists should pause and reflect before they decide to combine writing with teaching.

For somewhat older novelists there is the possibility of making a more intensive use of what they are. "Look in your hearts and write," I heard one of them say to his students with an apologetic smile. If the novelists looked deeply enough into their own hearts and minds, they would find a broader image of American life than most of them have been presenting. I think of one example, that of William Faulkner, who lived in a Mississippi town and wrote essentially for himself, sometimes without thinking, so he said, that strangers might read what he wrote; yet when strangers did read it they found that his books contained a picture of the Deep South and an interpretation of Southern history—even a system of values and a myth of the sort that critics had been admiring in Hawthorne and Melville.

While the Stew Bubbles

IN THE HORRIBLE old days, one of the first rights granted to women was a legal limitation on the size of the stick with which a husband could beat his wife. From that indulgence, the progress of women toward a just share in a man's world has been steady. This book celebrates the women of the United States who have in recent years been active and successful in politics.

Ladies of Courage, by Eleanor Roosevelt and Lorena Hickok (Putnam; $3.75).

Along the way, there have been some gruesome episodes, as the authors point out:

> A hose thrust through a window sprayed ice water over Lucy Stone one cold winter night, but she wrapped her shawl about her and went on speaking. In one city the mayor mounted the platform with a woman speaker, revolver in hand, to protect her.

And there was Consuelo Bailey in Vermont, a prosecuting attorney called out one night to view the body of a woman hit on the head with a stick of firewood (size not given). The sheriff and a deputy picked her up and drove her to the scene of the crime:

> "At the farmhouse we entered a dark, musty woodshed, then a kitchen dimly lighted by a kerosene lamp. Along the walls were lined up the town fathers, grim, silent, motionless . . ." She could feel their shrewd Yankee gaze upon her as she walked over and looked down "at the small body of a woman, lying face down on the floor in what seemed to me at the moment an ocean of blood." The new prosecuting attorney did not faint, gasp or tremble. She, too, has some of the granite of Vermont in her. Nobody said a word, but she had passed the test.

The volume describes many examples of women who ran for public office and were elected, or who were apppointed to positions as high as the President's Cabinet. There was Mary W. Dewson who in 1933 had the title of Director of the Women's Division of the Democratic National Committee, who entered politics, like so many women, from social work. It was said of her that in an absent-minded moment she entered an elevator in the Department of Labor and said, "Fourteenth and F street," to which the operator replied, "Madam, we are not permitted to take these elevators outside the building."

It was Molly Dewson who won equal representation for women on convention committees, and it was she who organized regional meetings of women, and pushed women into more useful and responsible jobs than licking envelopes. It was Mary Norton of New Jersey who was the first woman (or man) to become chairman of three legislative committees when she retired. In the long list of such women, the authors also praise Margaret Chase Smith and Frances Bolton, Republicans, who have dignified the presence of the ladies in Congress. There are also some kind words for Perle Mesta, Ivy Baker Priest, Oveta Culp Hobby and Mary Lord, and the Richard L. Neubergers of Oregon, man and wife, both elected to the State legislature.

In this long recital of political honors for women, the authors evade one crucial issue: no woman can skip off to make a political speech while the stew is bubbling on the front of the stove and the diapers on the back. It is all but impossible for a woman to do more in politics than the humblest errands unless she is independently wealthy, or has no children, or has raised her family.

In their zeal to deplore the inferior position to which men have shoved women, the authors give too little attention to the practical fact that it is far easier for a man to enter politics young enough to make it a career. One sentence about Mary Norton is typical: "On a morning when she knew she was in for a fight, she would put on her most becoming gown and, if she happened to have an orchid in the refrigerator, pin it on her shoulder." A charming notion, but when most women reach in the refrigerator, they are more likely to find a

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dish of enthusiastically molding prunes than an orchid.

Until the Lord contrives a less confining way of bringing new little voters into the world, women cannot enter politics equally with men. When the Women's Division of the Democratic National Committee was abolished as bankrupt, the authors suggest that precinct contributions as low as fifteen cents per woman would have saved it. But what they ignore is that even fifteen cents, for most women, intially comes from men. This is humiliating, but factual. The unreality with which the authors approach this problem is suggested by their comment about Helen Gahagan Douglas when her husband had entered the army and before she was elected to Congress: "With her eyebrow tweezers she was trying to pluck every last pin-feather out of a turkey. It was the first time she had ever seen an uncooked turkey outside the window of a butcher shop."

But the material of the book is heartening as it submits the proof of how many women in this country have overcome even these God-imposed and man-sustained handicaps. There is no doubt, as the authors assert, that women go after causes harder than men do, and that their level of earnestness and honesty is much higher.

There is a separate chapter on Mrs. Roosevelt for which Miss Hickok alone is responsible. It is a warm and often moving account of a life. One wishes that more of the chapters had such personal information as it contains, for the tendency of the book is not to individualize women, but to give an impression of one generalized character known as American political woman.

The style is of the sort often called "breezy," which usually means that a steady wind moans through the holes in the prose. PAUL ENGLE

Presidential Miracle

OF AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS to the art of government, the Presidency ranks perhaps as the most notable. For the bold conception of an executive, independent of the legislature but vested with authority ample for energetic action, the Founding Fathers deserve credit. Yet for solving the problem of how to choose and to control so powerful an executive, the credit must be allocated to the groping ghosts of historical adaptation acting through the mundane fumblings of practical politicians. Elsewhere the well defined processes of parliamentary politics govern the choice of chief executives; they both limit the field and test and reject those whose aim is the prime ministry. Or where attempts have been made to transplant the Presidency the result has most commonly been the creation of executives whose authority endures only so long as they retain the confidence of the military.

Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952, by Paul T. David and others (Johns Hopkins; 5 vols., $17.50).

Such contingencies here, it was supposed, would be avoided by the Electoral College which was designed to bring great wisdom to the choice of the Chief Magistrate. Yet this piece of constitutional apparatus was soon relegated to a purely ceremonial role. Instead, the choice of Presidents proceeds from the actions of a most complicated system of caucuses, conventions and direct primaries extending throughout the 48 states and erected by the political parties completely outside the formal constitutional order. Unlimited in its discretion, not bound by law, often unled, and frequently boisterous and inelegant in its manner, this rube-goldbergian contraption produces the Presidential candidates.

That we have had so long a run of Presidents including so few indubitable misfits could be regarded as one of the most extraordinary departures from the laws of chance in the history of nations. Or it could be interpreted as evidence of the excellence of our arrangements for the choice of Presidents. A critical element in these arrangements is the means for sifting possibilities for the Presidency down to a pair of contenders, each acceptable to the principal elements of his own party. A crucial step in that process consists in the choice of delegates to the national party nominating conventions. Generalizations about the selection of delegates have long been in the books, but they have rested on the most fragmentary data. To bring together a comprehensive account of this grass roots stage in Presidential politics, the American Political Science Association in 1952 set up a Co-operative Research Project on Convention Delegations with Paul T. David as director. He managed to enlist in the project over 200 persons, principally political scientists and their students, an accomplishment that must be regarded as no mean feat in research organization and management.

The outcome of their collective effort is a report of imposing proportions. Analyses of delegate selection within the individual states fill four of the five volumes. To assure the collection of comparable data the state-by-state accounts were fitted into a more or less uniform pattern. Each contains a brief description of the broad political background in the state and for each party's convention delegation there is an analysis of the selection process in 1952, of the composition of the delegation, of its activities and voting record at the convention, and of the aftermath in the state. A review and appraisal of the problem of state representation in the national convention concludes each state treatment. While the focus is on 1952, the state reports, from their sheer mass, approach more closely an encyclopedia of American politics than anything in print. Their information on personalities, factions, procedures, backgrounds will make these volumes of value not only to the student and practitioner of politics; they will also, for example, be indispensable guides for metropolitan reporters who make their quadrennial expeditions to the hinterland in 1955 and 1956 to feel the pulse of the country.

From the state-by-state accounts there emerges a sense of the vast complexity and variety of politics within the American states. Yet the four volumes of reports on states (grouped into the Northeast, the South, the Middle West, and the West, and available separately at $3.50 each) are not for recreational reading. Their utility rests more in their reference value. And they constitute a source of raw material for further analysis. The reader with a general interest in American politics will be more attracted by the first volume (sub-titled, "The National Story," and also available separately at $3.50). This volume, prepared by Mr. David with the collaboration of Malcolm Moos and Ralph M. Goldman, rests in part on the individ-

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ual state reports but draws also from other sources. Here the highlights of the 1952 pre-convention campaigns are set out, the proceedings of the conventions themselves are summarized, and the general problems of delegate selection are treated. A comparative analysis of state procedures for the selection of delegates will turn out to be valuable to state legislators when they are confronted in 1955, as they invariably are in the sessions before a Presidential year, by proposals for the alteration of their state laws bearing on the selection of national convention delegations.

Included in this volume also is the most thoughtful analysis available of the various proposals for the extension and reform of the Presidential primary. It ought to be read by all those who see the salvation of the Republic in the extension of the Presidential preference primary—as well as by those who regard the primary as an abomination. Although the authors estimate consequences rather than advocate changes, their findings make plain that any drastic tinkering with the national convention system and the methods for the choice of delegates should be preceded by the most responsible and the most perceptive consideration. Most delegates arrived at the conventions, it is concluded, "with their frame-of-mind attuned to the parochial concerns of county, congressional district, state and region." No matter how they were chosen and despite the complexity and cumbersomeness of the entire system, in the end:

> most of the delegates were thinking less about the constituents in their home districts and more about the problems of their party as a national organization with a national constituency—one, moreover, that could not win unless it could appeal effectively to a majority of the American electorate.

In all this there may well be a trace of pardonable exaggeration. Yet it remains something of a miracle that the Presidential nominating process by one way or another unites in support of a single candidate the divergent forces of section, the conflicting ambitions of leaders, and the competing interests of class, of group, and of localities scattered over a continent. Whether the report succeeds in explaining the miracle may be open to doubt, but it does present the most complete picture of the process on record. It may, indeed, be appraised in a critical vein as more reportorial than interpretative. Yet it should be evaluated for what it was intended to be. As an account of a major episode of our national politics, the report stands as a substantial achievement. And as an interpretation of the process of Presidential nomination it is not by any means lacking in very real merit.

V. O. KEY JR.

No Final Vision

SINCE Paul Goodman's brilliance both makes and unmakes this book, the question I found myself asking, after having been laid flat by the critical onslaught, was what is it all for. What is it that criticism must do in order to be not only virtuosic but also valuable?

True to the spirit of this age of criticism, Goodman is as earnest and ambitious as can be. His aim is nothing less than to revise and supplement Aristotle,

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The Structure of Literature, by Paul Goodman (Chicago; $5).

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to write us a new *Poetics*. And indeed, his unusual combination of skills—he is a creative writer, critic and practising psychologist as well as a close student of Aristotle—equips him to add to the Aristotelian technique of formal analysis his knowledge of modern literature and the modern intellectual disciplines. Like Aristotle, Goodman looks for the rational structure of a literary work, the principle by which the parts combine into a beginning, middle and end to make a single whole. But he claims to correct Aristotle by employing what he calls "inductive formal analysis"—by allowing the work to dictate its own principle of unity, rather than by testing it against the principle of unity in other works.

Thus, Aristotle derives his description of the complex tragic plot inductively, mainly from Sophocles' *Oedipus;* but makes the mistake of testing other plays against the structure won from *Oedipus*. A fine play like Sophocles' *Philoctetes* is by Aristotelian standards a failure, because it employs a *deux ex machina,* a dénouement not arising from the plot, and because it has a happy ending. But *Philoctetes* is a miracle play, says Goodman, and he goes on to show that the point of its structure is to bring matters to an impasse in order to break through the impasse with a miracle. The pleasure comes not from the rational solution of the problems of the plot, but from the sheer renewal of life.

This is as good an example as any of the method Goodman uses to refine the old distinctions between the genres—to find the structure and pleasure proper to a series of works ranging from Homer through Shakespeare, Jonson, Dryden, Flaubert and Kafka: even to distinguish between a poem of Baudelaire's and Dillon's translation of it, and a play of Labiche's and a René Clair screen adaptation of it.

The method is not to be quarreled with, and might serve as a lesson to those dogmatically "modern" critics who dismiss out of hand the literature which does not lend itself to their tools of analysis

Yet it has its dangers, as Mr. Goodman's use of it reveals. For though his analyses are too theoretical to pass for disconnected "readings"; he introduces, in his anxiety to do justice to the individual work, so many distinctions, so many exceptions and modifications, as to make us feel that he has been generalizing on a single case, largely through a trick of abstract vocabulary.

He establishes, for example, through an analysis of Jonson's *Alchemist* that in comedy the comic situation is in the end "deflated to normalcy." But then he goes on: "Many comedies are not deflated to normalcy. *The Clouds,* for example . . . what need for a deflation? *The Acharnians* is not deflated for the opposite reason . . . Comedies that can end undeflated have a peculiar heady glory (and socially are more aphrodisiac)." Or having established through an analysis of Flaubert's *L'Education Sentimentale* that novelistic plots are sentimental rather than ethical and progress not through dramatic scenes but through sentimental sequences, he contrasts Flaubert's novel with those of Balzac which are "ethical and tend to dramatic scenes," and then goes on to show that *Hamlet* has an essentially novelistic plot. When comedies are the better for not being "deflated," and the drama is "novelistic" whereas the novel is "dramatic," we are not coming out

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with any idea of genres that is going to be usable.

Goodman fails, I would say, in what the scientists call "elegance." For he has written a theoretical work without a theory, without an all-inclusive idea simple enough to be useful in tying together the individual analyses. As a result, the book gives us little that we can take away with us to apply to new situations. It is impossible to report in the end what the book says as a whole, but only what it says in particular places.

I recommend the heart of the book, therefore, the three chapters on "serious," "comic" and "novelistic" plots, where we can by ignoring certain exceptions make out a line of development simply because the same questions are asked throughout—what the relation is of plot to character, what moves the plot from one point to another, and by what reversal the plot achieves resolution. Thus, the serious plot, represented in tragedies, miracle plays, history plays and epics, is one in which the characters are "essentially involved" —so much so that in *Oedipus* there is no need to distinguish between plot and character:

> The incidents are probable from the whole of the character, exhausting its implications to such a degree that, given a certain turn of the action, the character is destroyed, like Jocasta, or altered throughout, like Oedipus blind and dethroned.

Only the foolish or "humorous" part of the character is involved in the comic plot and therefore destroyed by it. The rest survives in the state of normalcy to which the comedy returns—which is why we are not distressed by the comic destruction.

But in the sentimental or novelistic plot, the characters do not so much engage in the actions as they respond to them—which means that they remain essentially outside the plot using the actions for their own ends: "the persons have a scope and career greater than these particular actions." The point here is not the discovery which leads to a great action, but the "fixing of character"—the hero learns through a series of sentimental responses who he is.

Unity comes not from the singleness of action (no incident is ruled out as irrelevant) but from the singleness of response, from what we call the Point of View.

Here we have a movement of idea which is invaluable for understanding the difference between modern and classical literature. But the idea is obscured in the following chapter on lyrical poems where we are asked to consider new and in this context tediously minute questions of meter and diction; and it is all but obliterated in the final catch-all chapter called, "Special Problems of Unity," where too many different kinds of things are treated too summarily to do more than dazzle us into bewilderment.

At the risk of appearing ungrateful for the brilliant observations which the author scatters on all sides, I can only wish he had been willing to sacrifice such random felicities to maintain the original questions throughout. The disequilibrium between character and action that we find in the sentimental plot will, for example, explain the difference between a lyric of epigrammatic statement like the one of Catullus which he analyzes, and those dramatic lyrics of Wordsworth where the poet goes out into nature to find an occasion for response. Significantly, the chapter on lyrical poems is best where Goodman talks about the symbolization of plot in Tennyson's *Morte d'Arthur*. But he does not go on from there to make explicit the connection between the symbolizing and the sentimentalizing of plot.

Tennyson's epic plot becomes symbolic because it is absorbed in the modern nostalgic point of view. It becomes, in other words, an occasion for the response of Tennyson as projected through the Victorian narrator who, we are told in the last lines, has been reading the poem aloud with "perhaps some modern touches," and who in turn projects himself into Sir Bedivere. The poem is essentially Sir Bedivere's dramatic monologue, the events being the occasion for his reluctance to let the old order die and for his final regretful acquiescence in its death. I would like to suggest the connection between the dramatizing of lyric structure in the dramatic lyrics of Wordsworth and the dramatic monologues of Tennyson and Browning, and the lyricizing of dramatic structure in the sentimental play or novel.

My own critical preoccupations lead me to see at least a potential theory of literature at the one point where, amid the miscellanies of the final chapter, the author does return for a moment to the original questions. In discussing Hawthorne's short story, *The Minister's Black Veil,* he suggests that Hawthorne's Veil is a symbol in the same sense as Tennyson's plot, as an occasion for the responses of the characters—and that these responses create the supernatural element of the story, not as an objective entity, but as a "sentimental point of view." The implication is, as I see it, that meaning in all these modern forms exists as perception, as a creation of the characters with no adequate objective correlative in the action. Such a line of connection could yield a theory to carry us from classical to romantic and symbolist structure, a theory which fully developed might indeed provide us with a new *Poetics*.

But whether or not Goodman would go along with this line of connection, the fact remains that his book lacks the steady growth of illumination which the best criticism ought to provide. For criticism should do for us in its way what art does. It should refresh and illuminate by reducing complexities to a final vision, even a feeling, that we can take away with us to use as a further ingress into literature. Goodman's book is more likely to frighten the prospective reader or writer of literature with a sense of the fatiguing difficulty of it all. Brilliant and important, his book is yet not as useful as it might be, because it is not—and this is as valid a judgment of criticism as of art—beautiful. The unfeeling aridities of his style (he affects the style of an Aristotelian treatise) are only the first signs of the more serious flaw in organization.

ROBERT LANGBAUM

Notes on the Critics

MALCOLM COWLEY'S present article is a section of his forthcoming book, *The Literary Situation.* PAUL ENGLE is the author of *An American Child* and other volumes of poems. V. O. KEY JR. is a professor of government at Harvard. ROBERT LANGBAUM, who teaches at Cornell, is at work on a study of form in Romantic poetry. WALTER GOODMAN has written frequently on British and American television. SHELLABY JACKSON is a Hollywood television writer and producer.

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TELEVISION

The Commercial Angle

1—Great Britain

THE BATTLE in Britain over commercial television is about finished. It began quietly with the government's May, 1952 hint that "some element of competition" was being considered for "the expanding field of television," established itself indecorously in the letters column of *The Times,* blazed in both Houses of Parliament, and has now deteriorated to a few pot shots here and there.

Through it all the government defends unenthusiastically its "typically British compromise." The government's forces in this debate comprised Tory backbenchers, advertising agencies and some advertisers, TV set manufacturers, and a smattering of journalists and others for show—all associated with a group calling itself the Popular Television Association.

The National Television Council constituted the anti-commercial bulwark, in sympathy with the whole Labour Party, prominent Conservative peers and Liberal leaders, the heads of all the major universities, church notables, and most of the newspapers, including *The Times, The Manchester Guardian,* and *The Observer.*

The arguments—becoming most vehement, most noisy and quite un-British just after the Coronation, which everyone agreed was treated with all due restraint and sensibility by the BBC, but was vulgarized in the United States by a monkey named Muggs and others intruding upon the anointing ceremony with deodorant ads—ran something like this:

For: It is clearly undemocratic for a government monopoly to control a mass-communications medium. Differences of opinion are the red cells of freedom.

Against: British radio—run exclusively by the BBC—has earned a place of high esteem in the wave-length world, for objectivity and fairness among other things. Freedom among advertisers means the rich squeezing out the less rich; assuming competition is desirable, another non-commercial corporation could be set up to compete with the BBC.

For: The financial resources to be pumped into television by advertisers will increase variety and raise entertainment standards by enticing into the medium those star performers and writers whom the BBC cannot afford—as in America.

Against: In its need to cater to the lowest denominator audience, commercial television will suck the medium down to the intellectual level of the semi-literate—as in America. Moreover, in a Gresham's Law operation, it may well carry BBC TV along with it, driving out what good currency now exists.

For: Newspapers thrive on advertising, yet they are not all scandal sheets. Why do they become so squeamish about TV's doing exactly what they themselves have been doing for many profitable years—fear of competition perhaps?

Against: Whereas a newspaper may merely accept an advertisement and fit it into its makeup, it will, if it is an upstanding journal, permit no interference with content. Television advertisers will be sponsoring specific items; it is only natural that they will make their desires known by supporting certain kinds of things and withholding funds from others. In addition, advertising on TV is more attention-compelling, more an invasion of privacy than it is on a printed page.

For: Commercials need not be crude or repellent. They can be handled in a quiet and gracious manner, in a British manner in fact.

Against: This is wishful thinking. Advertisers all over the world are brothers under the skin, and the most striking commercial is not likely to be the most gracious. We must refer you to America:

> Hark the Herald Angels sing,
> Beecham's pills are just the thing.
> Peace on earth and mercy mild,
> Two for man and one for child.

For: Is it not a slight on the British people to assume that they are too childish to decide their likes for themselves? Are clerics, school teachers and BBC longhairs really the best judges of what the nation may see and hear?

Against: Television is too important an achievement to be given over into the hands of businessmen. The country acknowledges the BBC's success in fulfilling its Charter requirement to provid "entertainment, information, and education." Commercial TV may offer more popular mass entertainment; it will not take on the latter obligations.

Although these arguments are by no means buried, they can be shunted aside for now. The Television Bill has already passed its second reading on a straight party division. When the last-ditch defenders of the BBC get back their breaths and take time to mull over some of the less obvious implications of the new set-up, they may find that neither they nor their adversaries have proved good prophets of British television's new look.

The bill sets up an Independent Television Authority, theoretically in competition with the BBC. The Authority, closely watched over by the Postmaster General, will be granted a £750,000 subsidy—at the behest of some opponents of commercial TV who wanted to keep the government's oar in. This subsidy, drawn from the same license fees which support the BBC, is earmarked for financing shows that don't excite a sponsor as an investment.

The tone and style of the Authority shall be "predominantly British," an assurance to home talent that it will not go unfed and to those familiar with the American product that it can't happen in England. The Authority will provide transmitters to British contractors—not advertising agents—who will put together the programs and sell time to enterprising entrepreneurs.

The advertisements themselves may come only at the beginning and end of shows and at "natural breaks." Religious, political, and strike advertising is out. Advertisements shall not be so long as to detract from the value of the programs. The Authority is forbidden to buy sole broadcast rights of "public ceremonies, public spectacles, and important sporting events." The Postmaster General can require the Authority to broadcast material he wants put on the air; he can specify signing-on and signing-off times; he can require it to build new stations—only about half the country is due to be covered by the second channel—and install new equipment.

The restraints are stringent—stringent

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enough, some predict, to frighten off prospective advertisers and leave the Exchequer burdened with a second and inferior BBC. But restraints can be interpreted as the occasion demands, and a friendly administrator holds office in Whitehall.

Certainly, for sheer popular entertainment, the new commercial channel can only improve the situation. Instead of the system of competing entertainers—as in America, where the network race is so close that only the names differ from channel to channel—England may find that it has two stations fulfilling two distinct needs. With the example of the BBC Radio's Home, Light, and Third programs before them, the producers of non-commercial television will be able to concentrate on the serious, the informative, the experimental, leaving advertisers to supplement them with the ordinary and with the merely spectacular. The changeover may have to be made surreptitiously; some quarters will bring pressure on the BBC to try to give every man his three pounds a year worth of run—but the pressure will have less force behind it than if no commercial outlet existed.

Instead of being dragged down to the level of the dullest listener, as opponents of commercial TV have prophesied, the BBC will be able to leave this chap to its new companion of the airwaves. The Independent Television Authority is going to be supervised closely enough so that it cannot go *too* lowbrow anyway; and now the BBC can go to work for those parents who want educational shows for their children and adult entertainment for themselves.

WALTER GOODMAN

2—Hollywood

ON THIS LITTORAL where anything controversial sends the men who produce television shows scuttling under their desks, it is hard to imagine how feebler stuff could be made, particularly in the field of the filmed half-hour drama—the bread-and-butter of TV.

Much of the fault lies with the system of commercial sponsorship. The advertising agencies will take commissions every time but almost never take a chance, and they've built up a list of taboos as long as your arm. The script writer—our nomination for the man most likely to be indigent at any given time—even if he had an original notion, which he rarely does any more, must squirm through a jungle of "don'ts." Politics, sex, adultery, unemployment, poverty, crooks in high places, even liquor—nix. And almost anything else which might be relevant to life as it's lived—also nix. What the writer has got left to write about are men with guns, and domestic discord. Patriotism also is still safe, so long as it concerns a bygone time, but there's a drawback here: it costs money to rent costumes.

We mentioned liquor as a taboo. If you're thinking of profits on re-runs, a martini is a risky thing to have around in a TV drama, because somewhere along the line there is a beer sponsor, and beer sponsors like their actors to be quaffing brew. Ideas are beyond the pale, but even objects are dangerous. Like automobiles. A Chevrolet dealer buying time on a local station won't take drama in which the leading man tools around in a Ford. There are pitfalls in food, too. One harried writer wrote an innocuous teleplay in which the leading man went on a diet in order to make weight for a boxing match. But the ad agency threw the whole thing out because it had a client—a client, incidentally who had absolutely no connection with the story in question—who marketed a ready bake mix. One taboo spawns six new ones.

The safest thing to do is to stay indoors with the camera, preferably in a one-room apartment whose decoration is nondescript, and grind out some aimless violence which takes place because of missing jewels. As the safest approach also happens to be the most inexpensive, the producers are delighted to fall in line with the agencies. Thus, the perfect story is one in which the hero, trench-coated and snarling, flips dialog at a blonde, solves crimes and fights like a leopard for a full twenty-six minutes against a bare wall. The remaining four minutes are reserved for those heavy-handed commercials which have you jumping out of your chair in exasperation.

The dramatic series idea (*Dragnet, I Love Lucy*) consists of central characters who, presumably, can go on forever, and either an outline or script for the first story. This idea becomes a "package" when a name player from the shrinking feature film business has indicated his willingness to make the jump into TV. Plenty are willing to jump, because there are plenty of Hollywood actors out of work. Then, when someone has faith enough to risk about $30,000 in filming that first script, you're up to the "pilot" stage. But you're still not halfway home. The pilot must be sold to an ad agency, then a sponsor (a pair of notable hurdles) and once sold must attain some sort of popularity with the public fairly quickly. Otherwise, the axe will fall after the first 13 weeks.

The casualty rate on pilots is high—perhaps one in ten finds its way onto your screen as a scheduled show. The casualty rate on series ideas, outlines, first scripts and the like is fearful, about one in 500 even graduates to the pilot stage.

Writers like to tell themselves and each other that TV is a giant maw chewing up material at a furious rate, and that they'll have to pound out stories and yet more stories to feed the monster. This may be true, but it is also true that discouragingly few of the creative people—actors, writers, directors—seem to be making much money. On the freelance market today a teleplay will bring from $750 to $1200, a respectable chunk of dough even on the low end, but a teleplay is hard to sell, and at the end of a year the taxi driver who hasn't netted more than the freelance TV writer just isn't hustling. Actors are perenially broke and having their Jaguars repossessed, while directors—who work on the princely scale of about $550 a week—are given two days to shoot a complete half-hour teleplay, and need three days in a hospital on their own time to recover.

The whole business is a kind of frenzy. Sell, sell, sell—dozens of men with white teeth pushing packages of cigarettes at you, dozens of well-groomed women batting their eyes and pushing packages of soap at you. The networks and the admen are gambling that the public is not only patient but supine. If they're right—and up to now there's little reason to think otherwise—the prospect for variety in TV is bleak.

SHELLABY JACKSON

Hollywood

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THEATRE

World Theatre in Pictures from Ancient Times to Broadway, by Tom Prideaux (Greenberg; $7.50) has two limitations not announced in the title. One is that it is less a pictorial history of the theatre than an anthology of pictures from *Life* magazine: the plays pictured are from all periods, but the productions are all modern. The second limitation follows from the first: it is the limitation of *Life's* style. Mr. Prideaux writes:

> To *Life* photographers goes the credit for having developed a new style of theatre photography, in contrast to the usual frozen stills which are customary for lobby displays. . . . Their aim is to create a candid-picture sequence which catches the play in action (whole scenes are re-enacted for the cameraman), and at the same time to enhance the mood of the play by special lighting and composition.

Life pictures, therefore, are not theatre but "enhanced" theatre — theatre seen by a light that never was on sea or land and in "compositions" that reveal themselves to cameras placed where no spectator ever sits (e.g. in the wings or the orchestra pit). To be thoroughly happy with Mr. Prideaux' pictures you have to be more interested in photography than in theatre. All his photographs are good and some are superb.

Theatre Pictorial is "a history of world theatre as recorded in drawings, paintings, engravings, and photographs, by George Altman, Ralph Freud, Kenneth MacGowan, William Melnitz" (California; $10). It costs more than the Prideaux, though it is an inferior job of bookmaking; the pictures, reproduced by offset, look drably grey beside Mr. Prideaux's glossy black.

Nor is the authors' scholarship unexceptionable. In a source book of theatre history (and *Theatre Pictorial* is that) one expects to find the credentials of each bit of evidence. For example, it is not enough to be told "at left is a multiple setting" and that the authors received the illustration from Professor Niessen of Cologne. One can attach no value to a picture until one knows, as nearly as possible, who made it, under what conditions, and when. The lack of such information is a primary fault of a book which has many secondary faults. For example, as of about 1930, the authors' attention seems to switch arbitrarily from Europe to America; the choice of European items after that date is meager and arbitrary. As for the commentary, it is neither simple enough for the beginner nor critical enough for the advanced student. If there is mind behind any of the writing it is of some vaguely progressivist sort: Jouvet is characterized as a pioneer, Appia and Craig are said to have "*literally* revolutionized the theatre of the entire world" (my italics). If you have only two lines for Vakhtangov of what use is it to observe that he is "solider than Taïrov and Meyerhold" of whom also you have said nothing to speak of? And yet in no one book that I know is the history of the theatre so fully depicted as here.

John Gassner reviewed a book of mine so favorably not long ago that I am disqualified as a reviewer of his *The Theatre in Our Times* (Crown; $5) but I should like to cite his prefatorial defense of books of essays (as against unified treatises), for it seems to me a much called-for rebuttal of a prejudice. Mr. Gassner points out that to write a unified treatise is not necessarily harder; nor should it interest the reader more, as a book of essays will reflect the many-sidedness of a critic's mind where the treatise shows but one facet. "I have found my responses too divided," says Mr. Gassner, "to formulate doctrine"; so he didn't go thorugh his MS. deleting observations which might look "inconsistent"; such observations are apt to be the best part of any book.

I should like to quote at greater length what Mr. Gassner has to say on Broadway's rejection of irony and satire:

> The usual procedure . . . notably in the long successful Kaufman school of playwrights, has been to take some bold and resounding steps toward *satire* and then, just as loudly, to retreat to a hastily improvised position of geniality. The classic example of this Sabine method of dramaturgy may well be *The Man Who Came to Dinner*, which consists of two acts of satirical exposé and a third act in which the authors allowed their egotistical Alexander Woolcott character to redeem himself by ridding his secretary of her rival in a love affair. This ending was not hit upon until the play was already in rehearsal.

When I say that I haven't yet digested Michael Redgrave's *The Actor's Ways and Means* (Theatre Arts Books; $3) I mean it wholly as a compliment. The book is elusive by its moderation and subtlety: if you asked me where Mr. Redgrave stands, say, on Stanislavsky, I should have to go back and re-read him; for he loves the Russian maestro decidedly this side of idolatry and adds not a few practical provisos and sobering *aperçus*. Both instructive and amusing, this is a highly unusual book in that none of our theorists that I know of has had so much experience of acting and none of our actors has proved so effectively articulate about his craft. Sometimes the scholarship is a little skimpy and even, perhaps, unscrupulous —I recall one place where Mr. Redgrave follows Lee Strasberg almost word for word without letting the reader know it. But I may be disqualified as a reviewer of Mr. Redgrave too. When *he* reviewed a book of mine, he compared me to Polonius.

Undoubtedly one of the chief drama publications of the season has been the new edition of *Around Theatres* by Max Beerbohm (Simon & Schuster; $6). The dandy as dramatic critic is an entertaining phenomenon—compared with what we have nowadays—yet not, in the end, an inspiring one. Of Beerbohm, one can't precisely say that he disliked the theatre, but one can surely complain that he failed to be very interested in it. Instead of dramatic criticism, he offered—himself. When the play, or the actor, was a bad one, what could have been more agreeable? I should be the last to deny reading Beerbohm with pleasure. But you have only to compare his attacks on Shakespeare with Shaw's to see the difference between a pose and a purpose.

Critics who have expressed real dislike for certain things in the theatre have always turned out to be passionate devotees of certain other things in it. Beerbohm was incapable of dislike because he was incapable of passion: which is not an advantage. If he only had *disliked* Duse, he might have managed to say something about her—as Shaw did about Bernhardt, whom he disliked. As it is, his piece on the Italian actress is mere debunking. We enjoy Beerbohm because he is wittier and more eloquent than we are; but, compared with the greatest in his profession—say, Hazlitt, Lewes, Shaw, say even Agate—he is trivial. ERIC BENTLEY

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Furcoloration

There is one especial flaw in John P. Mallan's apologia on behalf of Foster Furcolo (*NR*, Correspondence, May 31) —he does not take into account that a man capable of what Furcolo did to the ADA is capable of doing the same thing to his stated Democratic principles.

A political Lizzie Borden should not be trusted with an ax.

The argument that Furcolo "had" to sneak up on the ADA and try to split its head open in order to appeal to the more conservative Democratic voters is not even good politics. Alienating a large body of intelligent voters and community leaders sensitive to the all-over issues can accomplish nothing more than to strengthen the opposition.

By contrast, consider Michigan, where the ADA was an "issue" in three gubernatorial elections, Mennen Williams never resorted to Furcoloration, and won three times, the last time in a Republican landslide.

Behind the Furcolo action, I fear, is the reliance that the ADAers and independent voters will vote for any candidate with a liberal platform no matter what he does to them. Some Democratic politicians count on the "hard core" of intellectuals, at the same time ignoring or even insulting and injuring them in a play for votes at other levels. This used to work, in a limited way, but it can't any more, because ADA and its independent counterparts have emerged, in the midst of the effort to discredit them, as a highly respected national force, capable not only of delineating the issues but of defending themselves against political bullies.

If we are to become a mature nation politically, we need the ADA a whole lot more than we need Mr. Furcolo.

LEO A. LERNER

Chicago, Illinois

• • •

I can only add two observations to the controversy that appeared recently in the *New Republic* regarding the strange case of Foster Furculo and the ADA.

The first observation is a somewhat analogous story. Some years ago, a Democratic Congressman, no longer among the living, filed suit against a number of people, including myself, for having quoted in a paid political advertisement a pro-Hitler statement which he had made at a public meeting. The Congressman, who flatteringly sued each of us for $100,000, had a strong New Deal voting record in domestic affairs. But he was isolationist to the core.

During the examination before trial, a Democratic leader tried to have the case settled. We agreed that we would retract and apologize if the Congressman would repudiate Father Coughlin and the Christian Fronters. The Democratic leader contacted the Congressman, then telephoned me to say that the Congressman would be very happy to repudiate the Christian Fronters but could not do so "because he says they elected him."

Foster Furcolo might well be willing to repudiate the McCarthyites, but he feels he cannot do so because he is counting on their votes to elect him to the Senate. He evidently felt that it would be more expedient to repudiate his erstwhile friends in the ADA.

My second observation is that like so many men with political ambitions, Mr. Furculo seems to feel that the most important thing he can do, in terms of his own convictions, is to get himself elected to public office. Although such a strategy is not uncommon among politicians, it is dangerous.

The ADA has a record of genuine liberal anti-Communism of which no political candidate need be ashamed. It has often been said that the trouble in Washington is "not the heat, but the timidity." Why add to it?

JAMES LOEB JR.

Saranac Lake, N. Y.

► Farmers and Flexibility

I have read your two articles on agricultural policy by Henry A. Wallace and C. Clyde Mitchell (*NR*, May 3, May 10).

Both writers have said much with which I agree. However, I think the attitude of Mr. Wallace toward farm price supports is much more realistic than that of Mr. Mitchell. Farmers *do* respond to changes in price in planning their production. They *do* reduce production when prices fall. We have had many excellent examples of that since World War II. When hog prices were low in the winter of 1952-53, farmers reduced production and prices rose very sharply in 1953-54. Now farmers have increased production again and prices will drop sharply during next fall and winter.

The parity concept was of great value to agriculture as a battle-cry in calling attention to farm problems in the 1920's and '30's. It has been a handicap to agriculture as a formula for setting prices. The political tendency is to regard 90 percent of parity, or 100 percent, as something to which every commodity group is entitled. Thus, if corn prices are supported at 90 percent of parity, then wheat prices must be supported at the same level. Yet under present conditions 90 percent of parity on wheat is a far higher price in relation to demand and supply than is 90 percent of parity on corn.

I agree with Clyde Mitchell that programs to improve nutrition in America and to make constructive use of our agricultural reserves overseas have great merit.

I also agree that the poverty problem in American agriculture is a serious one. It has had little real attention from either the Democrats or the Republicans. This is really the main "farm problem" in America. The answer is a Point Four program here at home among our own poor, unproductive farmers. Price supports get all the attention from the public and from the politicians. But they are of considerable less importance than the agricultural poverty problem. As President Eisenhower said in his message to Congress, price supports are of benefit only to about 2 million farmers who produce about 85 percent of the farm products for market. The other 3 million farmers deserve some attention, too.

LAUREN K. SOTH

The Des Moines Register and Tribune
Des Moines, Iowa

► Tactics of Debate

Denis Healey writing in your issue of May 24 says, "It seems likely that as so often in Labour Party history, the struggle will revolve around personalities and the issue of loyalty to the movement rather than the political questions which Bevan has raised. Certainly this is more

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favorable ground for the anti-Bevanite leaders . . ."

Mr. Healey should know, since both this and his earlier *New Republic* article on Bevan could not be improved upon as examples of the technique of going for your man when you can't meet his arguments—right down to that snide last paragraph bringing in Bevan's recent appearance in the Traffic courts.

There is a perfectly good reason for Mr. Healey's choice of tactics. On the issues with which they disagreed with their cabinet colleagues at the time of their resignation, e.g., the need for some scaling down of defense expenditure and for a more common sense attitude about East-West trade, the Bevanite ministers have so far been proved so in the right that even a Conservative government has seen fit to adopt their policies.

J. F. GOLAY

Oxford, England

► Guarding the Guardians

Maybe because of my sacred profession I note an ethical element has been injected into the doings of that unholy circus, the McCarthy hearings in Washington. A clipped picture has been introduced purporting to prove something not shown in the original snapshot and a letter submitted as an official letter of the FBI when it was no such thing. If I had a guest in my home who wished to discuss with me the validity of the moral claims of the Ten Commandments, I would not argue with him; I would count the spoons and hide my money. Anyone who would tamper with a picture to enhance the picture's value as evidence, or lifts messages from passages from context to deceive, has evidenced his discarding of the ancient code of morals embodied in the Ten Commandments.

REV. A. L. BYRON-CURTISS

Utica, N. Y.

► Moderate Priced Medical Care

Mr. Illing's letter in your May 31 issue cannot be left uncorrected. It is most probably quite true that Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands have much fewer public health officers than the U. S., but this does not imply at all that their services are less efficient. A much more vital point is, however, not mentioned at all by Mr. Illing. Having relatives in Holland, I know about the extremely effective Health Insurance system of the Dutch, and I also know how widespread Health Insurance is in Germany, Denmark, and other European countries.

OSWALD WYLER

Albuquerque, N. M.

► Stevenson in Mississippi

Loyal Mississippi Democrats are unable to understand why Adlai Stevenson finds it politically worth his while to visit Governor White, who walked out of the 1948 national convention, gave heavily to the Dixiecrat movement, had to be dragged into supporting the party in 1948, and whose whole public career betrays no trace of democracy or liberalism. While he is not one of the professional Negro-baiters, yet his election was due to a combination of last minute racial slurs on his opponent. White will not be in office at the next national convention. His personal influence is slight. Is Adlai determined to win Southern Bourbon votes: and can such tactics keep support of Northern states whose electoral votes are essential? Who has been advising such political ineptitude?

WILLIAM COX

Jackson, Mississippi

► A Superficial Slip

In your issue of May 24 Gerald Johnson, seeking a historical parallel for certain contemporary political events, speaks of the decisive defeat of "the Russian general, Rennenkampf," at Tannenberg. The battle of Tannenberg (August 26-30, 1914), which took place on the field where, in 1410, a Polish-Lithuanian army had routed the Teutonic Knights, witnessed the destruction, by Hindenburg and Ludendorff [working together as a team for the first time], of the Russian general *Samsonov's* army. Samsonov shot himself on the field where more than 100,000 of his men were taken prisoner.

Another Russian general, Rennenkampf, commanding forces northeast of Tannenberg, refused to come to Samsonov's aid.

THEODORE SPAHN

Chicago, Illinois

► The Critics' Critic

That old combination in restraint of trade — Schwartz and Jarrell — is tiresome. This *Partisan Review* group does not belong to *New Republic*. Why, your review on Jarrell's *Pictures from an Institution* was outstanding for fairness. But Schwartz on Jarrell or Jarrell on Schwartz—don't kid the literate!

CLAIRE JACOBS

Bronxville, N. Y.

► Dissent to Sidney Hook

Sidney Hook's review of Henry Steele Commager's book (Issue of May 24), was not a review at all, but a violent counter-argument. It has always seemed to me that an ethical reviewer grants the reader (and the author) the justice of a clear exposition of the work under review before launching into a series of second-guesses.

O. SCOTT ESTRELLA

San Francisco, California

• • •

Since Professor Hook is so concerned with *consequences*, perhaps it would do him good to examine the consequences of the Justice Department's listing of subversive organizations. . . . Here in Canada where we have similar problems of security, though on a smaller scale, there is no public listing of so-called subversive organizations for the simple reason that such an activity could in no way further the aims of national security. The awful *consequence* from the point of view of liberalism is that people join only those organizations which could not possibly be tainted and which do not entertain the discussion of controversial matter. Not every group whose precepts are unpopular is thereby conspiratorial. It is this type of government action (which Professor Hook seems to accept) that leads one to think that perhaps its authors and supporters fear freedom of discussion and association more than they fear conspiracy.

GERALD COOPER

Outremont, Quebec

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